Good turnout and strong panel contributions from Erik Solheim, N. Ram (Editor in Chief, The Hindu) and Gopalkrishna Gandhi (Ex-W. Bengal Governor). Vigorous debate focusing on India’s role in Sri Lanka the result at yesterday’s Chennai book launch event.
Many thanks to the Madras Book Club for organizing and the Asian College of Journalism for hosting the event.
3 March book launch at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) in Colombo. Full house, stimulating panel, and a feisty discussion!
Thoughtful coverage of the recent Colombo launch of my Sri Lanka book from event panelist Jehan Perera of the National Peace Council. It comes in his weekly column for The Island newspaper.
The context in which Jehan places it – Sarath Fonseka’s recent parliamentary pronouncements on the role of international observers in Sri Lanka – is, however, rather more controversial.
The Island, March 14, 2016, Jehan Perera
The issue of international participation in Sri Lanka’s transition process continues to remain a matter of speculation with different pronouncements being made by different members of the government. However, support for an international role in ascertaining the truth of what happened in the last phase of the war has received a boost due to the maiden speech in parliament made by former army commander Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka.
His credentials as a champion of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and unity as a state cannot be denied even by his political opponents. It was he who turned round the military debacles of an earlier period and achieved military success by leading from the front. Speaking in Parliament the former army commander said that Sri Lanka should permit foreign observers to participate in any inquiry on whether war crimes had been committed in the last phase of the country’s war.
During the period of the last government, the former army commander was victimised by its leaders who saw him as a potential threat to their monopoly of power. After the election of President Maithripala Sirisena the former army commander was compensated for the political victimisation he suffered and was also promoted from the rank of General of the army to that of Field Marshal.
After the general election that saw the formation of a government of national unity, he was also appointed to parliament on the national list and thereafter made a cabinet minister. He disclosed that government decision makers during the final period of the war had asked him to get out from operational duties and assigned the political authorities to handle the military operations. In his maiden speech in Parliament that “If there are any who violated the laws then inquiries should be held and punitive actions taken against them.”
Since the end of the war in May 2009 there has been intense pressure on the government to investigate whether war crimes took place in the closing stages of the war due to indiscriminate and mass killing of civilians and also whether there was targeted killing of LTTE leaders and their families who surrendered to the Sri Lankan military. There has been strong opposition to the issue of international participation agreed to in the Geneva Resolution that was co-sponsored by the government.
In his speech, Field Marshal Fonseka said that under his leadership the military “had waged the war in accordance with international law.” But he also said that “Inquiries should be made open to international observers who can observe whether there were any violations of international law.” It is significant that Field Marshal Fonseka spoke of international observers at the inquiry, and not foreign judges or prosecutors which is more controversial.
BOOK REPORTS
Field Marshal Fonseka also said in the course of his speech in parliament that he would reveal the truth about the final stages of the war, and in particular the “White Flag” issue, in which LTTE leaders surrendered to the Sri Lankan military after having been in touch with leaders of foreign countries that had been supporting Sri Lanka’s peace process. He said that he was in the process of writing a book in which there would be more facts emerging as to how the government conducted the war in the last stages, often with the knowledge and partnership of sections of the international community. Sometimes historians and those actors who write about their personal experiences are the custodians of a country’s history and their views give a more complete picture of the situation as it existed with all its real life complexities.
In this context it is interesting that a book that gives the international perspective of the last stages of the war which formed the centrepiece of the former Army Commander’s maiden speech in parliament has recently been published with the Sri Lankan book launch taking place earlier this month. It is an account of Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka titled “To end a civil war” and is authored by Mark Salter, a former BBC journalist and later a research scholar working in an international peace building organisation, International IDEA, based in Sweden.
This book of 550 pages provides a meticulously documented account of how Norway came to be involved in Sri Lanka’s last and most promising peace process. It also addresses the issues that arose at the last stages of the war, including the White Flag case. It has a large number of interviews with those who played a front line role during those days.
Japan’s peace envoy to Sri Lanka, Yasushi Akashi, who made more than twenty visits to Sri Lanka both during and after the war to support the reconciliation and negotiation process, comments on Mark Salter’s book saying “The sobering lesson we should all learn from these intractable experiences is that the final outcome of these efforts depends ultimately on political circumstances that are beyond the control of peace makers.”
But Norway’s peace facilitation in Sri Lanka has had a lasting impact that outlived the collapse of the Ceasefire Agreement in 2006. The Norwegian-facilitated peace effort was supported by influential members of the international community, with the United States, Japan and European Union becoming co-chairs. This legacy of constructive international involvement brought to the fore during the period of the Ceasefire Agreement continued to the end of the war and persists to this day.
LASTING IMPACT
Norwegian facilitation, initially at the invitation of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, began in the period prior to the year 2000 and attained its high point in 2002 with the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement by the government and LTTE. This gave the country the best opportunity to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, the high point of which was the Oslo Declaration in late 2002 in which the government and LTTE agreed to explore a federal solution to address the root causes of the conflict. Even today the contours of a just political solution will need to lie in the domain of the federal arrangements of power sharing in which the numerical preponderance of one community does not become a permanent tyranny of the majority as seen from the perspective of those who are doomed to be a permanent minority in an ethnically plural society.
The issue of international participation in Sri Lanka’s transition process today is one of the outcomes of Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka. It is what continues to give hope to the Tamil minority that there can be a just political solution to their problems. A special opportunity to negotiate a just solution during the government-LTTE pace process was reached with the Oslo Declaration on a power sharing arrangement on the basis of federalism. Public opinion surveys at that time confirmed that a majority of the population, weary of protracted war, were prepared to accept a federal solution if it would end the war. The military power of the LTTE gave the Tamil polity a more equal bargaining strength with that of the Sri Lankan state, which led to the Oslo Declaration.
However, the military defeat of the LTTE has brought into play the asymmetry in political power that a numerical majority has over a numerical minority within a democratic system. It led to a withdrawal from the federal vision and to rearguard action to even maintain what the 13th Amendment to the Constitution has to offer in terms of devolution of power. One of the lessons learnt from the Norwegian experience is the need to have a political framework in place, which is what the government is seeking to do through its constitutional reform process.
At a consultation on the peace process conducted last week with civil society representatives from all parts of the country, the participants were sub-divided into smaller groups for in-depth discussion on issues. The Tamil speaking group consisting mainly of persons from the North and East, expressed private doubts whether the current transition process would be successful. This is to be expected. They have seen previous efforts at reform and reconciliation come to nought. As a permanent numerical minority they need to have other factors that reduce the asymmetry in their bargaining strength.
The issue of international participation should not become or be seen as foreign interference that erodes national sovereignty. On the contrary, it is to strengthen the confidence of the Tamil polity in the transition process. If Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka’s statement on international observers is built upon constructively, it will contribute to greater confidence within the Tamil polity regarding the promise of national reconciliation.
http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=142010 …
They’re coming thick(ish) and fast(ish…. The Hindu‘s report on last week’s Chennai launch of my Sri Lanka book. Very strong panel at this event – and The Hindu’s Editor in Chief N. Ram in particular was highly effusive in his praise for the book. (And now I think of it, followed a close second by ex-Bengal Governor and senior Indian diplomat Gopalkrishna Gandhi).
Not the best photo of yours truly. But Erik S and Gopal G are obviously getting into the swing of things . . .
With President Maithripala Sirisena at the helm in Sri Lanka, this is the best opportunity to bring about a lasting solution to the country’s ethnic question, Norway’s former special peace envoy Erik Solheim said on Tuesday.
“The strength of Sri Lankan democracy is such that it has removed Mahinda Rajapaksa from the President’s chair. While he assured an inclusive approach post-war to settle the ethnic question, he never acted on the promise of reaching out to Tamils,” the former diplomat said.
Participating in a panel discussion on the newly-launched book To End a Civil War: Norway’s Peace Engagement in Sri Lanka , Mr. Solheim, who played a key role in the peace treaty signed between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in 2002, said there were two main obstacles to reconciliation in the island nation.
“The two main Sinhala parties — United National Party and Sri Lanka Freedom Party — were never able to work together. When one thought about making a move forward, there was always the apprehension of the other using it as a political tool to gain ground,” he said.
The second was the reliance of V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE chief, on violence. “He genuinely believed that there were military solutions to the political problems. This was political stupidity,” Mr Solheim said and added that the Norwegian peace delegation made it clear time and again to Prabhakaran that killings should stop if he had any hope of proscriptions in different countries being lifted.
Norway’s initiative
On the accusation that by treating LTTE on a par with the Sri Lankan government, Norway ended up giving legitimacy to the ‘terrorist organisation’ and refurbished its image, Mr. Solheim said whatever was achieved would not have been possible without reaching out to the other side. He added that the greatest achievement of the peace process that Norway initiated was the ceasefire, which saved thousands of lives.
N. Ram, Chairman of Kasturi and Sons Ltd, said the Indian policy on Sri Lanka was contradictory in the earlier stages. Under Indira Gandhi, the country provided sanctuary and training to the various militant groups. It ended up paying a heavy price by losing former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was assassinated by the LTTE.
However, the positive side of the experience was that since 1991, India has deployed a “hands-off” approach and refused to fall into the trap of the LTTE again. “This was despite pressure from fringe groups in Tamil Nadu and the Tamil diaspora,” he observed.
Squarely blaming the LTTE for derailing the Norway-faciliated peace process, Mr. Ram said while Prabhakaran was a military genius and had committed cadre, at the core, the LTTE was a ‘Pol Potist’ organisation. “Norway and others clearly failed to recognise this. After the death of Rajiv Gandhi, this should have been utterly clear. Norway should not have equated the Sri Lankan state with the LTTE,” he opined.
Mark Salter, the book’s author, said ‘Indian culpability’ in the whole affair also needed some reflection. He said the willingness of the parties involved was a crucial factor for the success of the process. “In the Sri Lankan context, when this willingness decreased, it showed on the results.”
Former West Bengal Governor and former Indian high commissioner in Sri Lanka, Gopalkrishna Gandhi, moderated the discussion.
Here’s Narayan Swamy’s report from last week’s Delhi book launch. And it’s India & LTTE – not Sri Lanka itself – that are very much in focus . . .
New Delhi, March 10 (IANS) Assassinating former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was the Tamil Tigers’ biggest mistake, a new book quotes the late LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham as saying.
Balasingham told Norway’s former Special Envoy to Sri Lanka Erik Solheim that LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and his feared intelligence chief Pottu Amman initially denied their involvement in the killing.
But they admitted the truth to Balasingham “a few weeks” after the May 21, 1991 assassination, says Mark Salter’s book “To End A Civil War” (Hurst & Company, London).
The just released 549-page book is the most exhaustive account of the Norwegian-led peace process that sought to end three decades of conflict in Sri Lanka.
The conflict finally ended when the Sri Lankan military crushed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, wiping out its entire leadership including Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman.
“Perhaps most controversially, in terms of official LTTE policies, Balasingham conceded that the killing of Rajiv Gandhi was the biggest mistake the LTTE had ever made,” says the book.
The LTTE has never officially admitted to killing Gandhi, who was blown up by a Sri Lankan Tamil woman suicide bomber at an election rally near Chennai.
Privately, Balasingham told the Norwegians that Gandhi’s killing “was a complete disaster”.
According to Solheim, Balasingham put the decision to kill Gandhi to Prabhakaran’s desire for revenge for Tamils killed by Indian troops when they were deployed in Sri Lanka in 1987-90, and a belief that Gandhi may again send the troops to Sri Lanka if he returned to power.
Solheim also says that although Balasingham, who in his final year was based in London and died of cancer in December 2006, wanted to reach out to the US and Europe, his real affinity was with India.
“Thus at the end of his life in 2006, Balasingham went so far as to try and ‘apologize’ to India for this misdeed (assassination).”
After Gandhi’s killing, India outlawed the LTTE – which was earlier based in Tamil Nadu and enjoyed New Delhi’s blessings – and declared Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman proclaimed offenders.
In contrast, Balasingham had no hesitation in admitting that the LTTE assassinated moderate Tamil leader and academic Neelan Tiruchelvam – who was critical of the Tamil Tigers — in July 1999 on a Colombo street.
When the Norwegians, Solheim included, confronted Balasingham on the killing, the book quotes the latter as saying point-blank: “Yes, we killed him and if you listen to me I will tell you why.”
The book quotes Solheim as saying that Balasingham once referred to Prabhakaran as a “warlord” and said the LTTE needed to transform into a political entity.
Balasingham also told Solheim, who is now based in Paris: “You must never underestimate the capacity for violence of these guys (LTTE).”
According to Solheim, Balasingham “was very frank with us, including admitting to the LTTE’s mistakes.
“Over time I came to regard Bala highly and to consider him as a great human being as well as a good friend.”
https://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/killing-rajiv-gandhi-lttes-biggest-mistake-095421068.html
Looking forward to this evening’s book launch here in Chennai with Erik Solheim, The Hindu‘s Editor in Chief Ram Narasimhan, Ex-West Bengal Governor Gopalkrishna Gandhi and Sashi Kumar, Chief of the Asian College of Journalism (ACJ).
Starts 18.00, at the ACJ.
Increasingly complex and widening conflicts have taken a huge toll on children in much of the Middle East in 2015, with parts of Africa and Asia facing protracted and relapsing wars that show no signs of abating, wrote Leila Zerrougui, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, in her annual report to the Human Rights Council. The Report covers the period from December 2014 to December 2015.
“Children were disproportionately affected, displaced and often the direct targets of acts of violence intended to cause maximum civilian casualties and terrorize entire communities,” she said in the report, describing how extreme violence affected countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Syria. “Groups perpetrating extreme violence also particularly targeted children pursuing their right to an education.”
Promoting a response to extreme violence that protects children
Military responses targeting groups using tactics of extreme violence continued to generate additional protection challenges for children. Throughout the year, militias and vigilante groups allied with States used children in support roles or as combatants. In addition, the use of airstrikes was of particular concern due, in many instances, to their indiscriminate nature.
The Special Representative reminded all involved that respect for human rights must be the basis of an effective response to extreme violence and actions must be undertaken in full compliance with international, humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. She added it is essential to emphasize the crucial role of prevention, as detailed in the UN Secretary-General’s plan of action to prevent violent extremism. Addressing the root causes of extreme violence, such as poverty and lack of economic opportunities for youth, lack of good governance, alienation of communities and political grievances, are necessary steps to find a lasting solution.
Attacks on schools and the right to education
In the report, Leila Zerrougui expressed her deep concern at the increasing number of attacks on schools, as well as military use of schools, in countries affected by war. Again in 2015, conflict disrupted the education of millions of children, creating a direct challenge to the realization of the Sustainable Development Goal of ensuring quality education for all children. She called for additional funding for education in emergencies and reminded all parties to conflict of their responsibility to ensure safe access to school.
Children, not Soldiers
In 2015, the momentum generated by the campaign Children, Not Soldiers remained strong and led to a significant reduction of verified cases of recruitment and use of children by national security forces, especially in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Myanmar. The campaign continued to mobilize political support, provide technical assistance and resources to the Governments in the process of implementing an Action Plan to end and prevent the recruitment of children. Unfortunately, renewed conflict reversed most progress accomplished in South Sudan and Yemen.
A majority of non-state armed groups listed by the Secretary-General for grave violations against children (32 out of 49) are active in countries concerned by “Children, Not Soldiers”. The campaign contributed to strengthening the tools in place to address the recruitment of children and generated new openings to engage in dialogue with armed groups on the protection of children.
“Through the campaign, Governments are developing or strengthening the legal framework to criminalize the recruitment of children and investing more resources and energy to fight impunity. This has created new openings to address other grave violations committed against children committed by all parties to conflict,” said the Special Representative, who is currently on mission in Afghanistan.
In her report to the Human Rights Council, Leila Zerrougui detailed how she used every opportunity of engagement with non-State armed groups and urges Governments to facilitate dialogue with a view to ending grave violations against children.
In her recommendations, she encourages Member States to treat children associated with armed groups primarily as victims and to use deprivation of liberty as a last resort and for the shortest time possible. She also calls for the universal ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict and for adequate resources to set up and maintain sustainable reintegration programmes for former child soldiers.
At the Atlantic Council early January, 2015. (L-R) Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, Mark Salter, author of To End a Civil War, Erik Solheim and Richard L. Armitage, former US Deputy Secretary of State.
Here’s some nice publicity for the book in yesterday’s edition of one of Sri Lanka’s best-established newspapers. Only shame is its offering such a jaundiced perspective on the Norwegian mediation effort in the country . . .
Norway failed in SL for want of broader int’l involvement – Solheim
The Island, 9 February 2016, by Shamindra Ferdinando
Washington DC-based Atlantic Council was recently told that Norwegian peace efforts, in Sri Lanka, in the 2002-2006 period, would have certainly succeeded had there been a broader international involvement. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The then powerful Norwegian minister and chief peace negotiator in Sri Lanka, Erik Solheim, told the Atlantic Council that the Norwegian project failed for want of required international support. The participants, at the discussion, as well as the audience, accepted Solheim’s assertion.
The Sri Lankan government hadn’t been involved in the discussion.
The Norwegian alleged that in the absence of a dedicated international commitment, the Sri Lankan military had waged war until an offensive was brought to a conclusion, in May, 2009. The then government launched a combined forces offensive, in early Sept. 2006, in the wake of the LTTE resuming eelam war IV, with large scale simultaneous operations in both the northern and eastern provinces.
Recalling the role played by India, Japan and Norway to broker peace in Sri Lanka, Solheim said: “a broader and stronger coalition of outside international players was needed.” The Norwegian conveniently failed to mention a significant US effort in support of the Norwegian initiative.
Solheim was participating in a panel discussion hosted by the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. Richard L. Armitage, who has served as Deputy Secretary of State, in the George W. Bush administration, and Mark Salter, author of To End a Civil War, which recounts mediation efforts in Sri Lanka, were also part of the panel. Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, moderated the discussion.
Solheim said patience was paramount from the first day on the ground: “Only if you can be patient and accept that there will be ups and downs then you can potentially have some impact on the path to peace.”
Solheim identified specific challenges, surrounding the diplomatic mission—namely, the dearth of information his team had on dealing with senior officials in both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. “We needed a bigger team to tap into Tamil-Sinhala relationships and, more importantly, we needed to gain insight into the unique leadership of the Tamil Tigers,” he said. “At the end of the day it was about this.”
Obviously, Solheim was making a foolish attempt cover up the Norwegian failure in Sri Lanka. Hadn’t there been a major international interest, in the Sri Lankan conflict, during the Norwegian project, the Atlantic Council wouldn’t even have considered taking it up, nearly seven years after the annihilation of the LTTE. The panel discussion, moderated by Bharath Gopalaswamy, underscored the abiding international interest in post-war Sri Lanka.
Seven years after her triumph, over terrorism, Sri Lanka is facing war crimes probe under the supervision of the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, today concluded a four-day visit to Sri Lanka.
The heavily US funded Atlantic Council is one of the most influential organizations shaping American and European foreign policy. Established over five decades ago, to promote the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Atlantic Council wields immense power. Having served the Obama administration, former Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel joined the Atlantic Council in early last year. Hagel served the Atlantic Centre as its chairman (2009-2013).
Contrary to Solheim’s assertion that a broader and stronger international coalition could have prevented an all out war, thereby ensured a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka, the grouping, involved in the 2002-2006 peace effort, had been perhaps one of the strongest backing a particular peace initiative.
Indian Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, as well as other panelists, conveniently forgot the circumstances leading to Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka, consequent to New Delhi’s diabolical project to destabilize the neighbouring country. India employed both terrorism and conventional military strategies to subvert Sri Lanka. No less a person than one-time Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit, had acknowledged the Indian destabilization project in his memoirs, launched in 2004.
Norway has been involved in Sri Lanka since 1997. Two years, later in May, the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga secretly requested Norway to explore ways and means of bringing the LTTE back to the negotiating table. Mrs. Kumaratunga revealed the Norwegian role soon after the LTTE made an abortive bid to assassinate her during the third week of December, 1999. Mrs. Kumaratunga’s extended an invitation to Norway, with the LTTE’s blessings. In fact, Norway was among five countries chosen by the LTTE as the likely third party to spearhead the peace initiative.
Against the backdrop of Solheim’s claim that the 2002-2006 peace initiative had failed for want of broader international involvement, it would be pertinent to examine the Norwegian-led highly publicized effort. The Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement had the backing of the US, EU and Japan. The US, EU, Norway and Japan functioned as Co-chairs to the peace process throughout this period. India, too, threw its weight behind the process though New Delhi refrained from playing a public role.
Regardless of what the likes of Solheim said today, Oslo ran a well coordinated, as well as an expensive project here. In fact, Norway gave the LTTE as much as possible international exposure, consequent to the then Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, and LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, endorsing the CFA, in February 2002. Norway arranged six rounds of direct negotiations between the two parties at overseas venues – Sattahip Naval Base, Chonburi, Thailand (mid – Sept 2002), Rose Garden Hotel, Nakhorn Pathom, Thailand (Oct-Nov 2002), Radisson SAS Plaza Hotel, Oslo, Norway (early Dec 2002), Rose Garden Hotel, Nakhorn Pathom, Thailand (January 2003), Norwegian Embassy, Nordic Embassy Complex, Berlin, Germany (early Feb 2003) and Hakone Prince Hotel, Hakone, Japan (mid March 2003).
In spite of Premier Wickremesinghe going out of his way to reach a negotiated settlement, to the conflict, the LTTE acted belligerently. In fact, Wickremesinghe took decisions, even at the risk of his political career, to pursue a peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, those who had been pushing Sri Lanka to reach an understanding with the LTTE never put real pressure on the LTTE. Had Solheim and other international players resorted to tough actions, to rein in the group, Prabhakaran wouldn’t have jeopardized the entire process by quitting the negotiating table, in April, 2003. The LTTE move created an environment for then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to dissolve parliament to pave the way for a general election, in April, 2004.
Western powers could have certainly prevented all out war had they taken tangible measures against the LTTE in the wake of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar’s assassination, in Aug. 2005, and the assassination attempt on the then Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, in April, 2006. Peacemakers turned a blind eye to high profile LTTE operations, thereby further strengthening Prabhakaran’s position, as well as those who believed in division of the country on ethnic lines. Instead of taking action against terrorism, perpetrated by the LTTE, Norway engaged in massive propaganda campaign meant to somehow keep the process on track.
Two years after the annihilation of the LTTE, Norway carried out a costly evaluation of its involvement in Sri Lanka under the leadership of Gunnar Sørbø of the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Jonathan Goodhand from the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).
The Norwegian study revealed even the involvement of NATO in support of the Norwegian effort. Both NATO as well as India had provided intelligence to Norway as well as the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, comprising Scandinavian countries. The support received from Norway, from the most powerful military organization in the world, underscored the significance of the Norwegian project here. The amount of secret US diplomatic cables, released by WikiLeaks, revealed the US interest in the conflict here and her efforts to manipulate political parties et al. Solheim had been among about 120 politicians and officials from various countries interviewed by those who had been involved in the Norwegian evaluation.
The report, released in Sept., 2011, revealed the Norwegian project went awry primarily due to wrong Norwegian assessment on Sri Lanka. Norway, and its partners, excluding the US, believed that Sri Lanka should tolerate the high handed actions of the LTTE. They took up this position on the basis of wrong assumption that the LTTE couldn’t be defeated on the battlefield, under any circumstances. They asserted that the Sri Lanka military could never succeeded against the Indian Army’s failure to crush the LTTE. Had the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa not succumbed to the LTTE ploy, India could have wiped out the LTTE. Premadasa saved the LTTE only to be blasted by a suicide cadre, four years later, on May Day, 1993.
The Norwegian evaluation report revealed the circumstances under which Oslo pursued a wrong policy, thereby paving the way for the LTTE to dig its own grave. The bottom line is that both Norway and the LTTE failed to realize the previous political-military leadership’s commitment to defeat the LTTE. The following section, reproduced verbatim, exposed the weakness in the Norwegian strategy: During an internal strategy session with Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store, in May, 2007, the mediation team reiterates that all observers think that this is a conflict that cannot be won by military means and most believe that the government cannot beat the LTTE militarily…” “In hindsight, the Norwegian underestimates the Sri Lankan government’s strength, both militarily and politically. The team considers a wide range of likely and less likely scenarios, but (like most observers at that time), it does not reckon with the sequence of events that is to follow: a strong SLFP-led coalition and military victory.
Even after the assassination of Minister Kadirgamar, and the attempt on Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s life, Norway continued to mollycoddle the LTTE. The peace co-chairs, too, failed to bring the LTTE to heel. In fact, they allowed the LTTE a free hand. In between the assassination of Minister Kadirgamar, in Aug., 2005, and the attempt on Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s life, the LTTE engineered UNP presidential candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe’s defeat at the Nov. 2005 polls.
Although, the TNA, on behalf of the LTTE, announced the polls boycott order, over a week before Nov. 17 polls, Western powers refrained from taking action. The then President Mrs Kumaratunga personally requested the then Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondvik, to ensure the LTTE didn’t interfere with the electoral process. The request was made on the sidelines of UNGA sessions in New York, in late September, 2005 (Norway to facilitate presidential poll-The Island September 2005). Veteran politician, R. Yogarajan, MP, in a brief interview with this writer, on Nov. 22, 2014, explained the LTTE move as well as the UNP’s efforts to persuade the LTTE not to interfere with the electoral process.
Had the LTTE listened to reason, perhaps, eelam war IV would never have taken place, Yogarajan asserted. “We knew something was amiss when the LTTE ordered public servants not to exercise their franchise at postal voting during the first week of November, 2005. All of us were seriously concerned. On the advice of the CWC leader, Arumugam Thondaman, I requested LTTE political wing leader, Thamilchelvam not to interfere with the electoral process. Thamilchelvam declined to cooperate. He also turned down my request for an urgent meeting with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran to discuss the matter. I was to accompany Thondaman. But Thamilchelvam insisted there is no point in visiting Kilinochchi as the decision cannot be changed under any circumstances. Thamilchelvam faulted the UNP for not making a formal request to the LTTE leader. We never wanted the LTTE to tell the people to vote for the UNP candidate.”
Still the Norwegians continued to appease the LTTE. Having narrowly won the presidential poll, Mahinda Rajapaksa, in spite of strong opposition from those nationalist elements, who had worked tirelessly for his victory, accepted Norwegian mediated talks, in Geneva. Rajapaksa sent top level delegations twice only to be humiliated by the LTTE which believed in swift battlefield victory over the military. The first round of talks, during the Rajapaksa’s presidency, took place in Feb. 2006, and the second, in Oct. 2006. The former President bent backwards to reach an understanding with the LTTE even after the LTTE resumed eelam war IV with large scale attacks in the northern and eastern provinces during the second week of August, 2006.
Solheim should explain Norway’s failure to rein in the LTTE. The Peace co-chairs, too, should examine their wartime strategy. Western powers could have intervened, at least in mid 2007, after the government liberated the Eastern Province. They refrained from exerting pressure on the LTTE to return to the negotiating table because they firmly believed Prabhakaran’s Vanni bastion couldn’t be conquered. Colombo-based Western diplomatic missions, the Indian High Commission, as well as UN, acted on the premise that the LTTE couldn’t be defeated in the Vanni. A section of the media, too, propagated that theory as late as the third week of December, 2008, as the Task Force I/58 Division and the 57 Division advanced on Kilinochchi, which the LTTE considered as its administrative capital. Canada-based veteran journalist, D.B.S. Jeyaraj confidently declared that the advancing Army would be defeated on the Vanni east front.
Jeyaraj asserted that in spite of vacating the Eastern Province by mid-2007, the LTTE retained an elite fighting cadre capable of routing the Army. Jeyaraj predicted the LTTE rolling back the Army. The Norwegians believed in the LTTE’s capability to turn around the situation. The Norwegian evaluation, in May, 2007, prompted the peace facilitator and co-chairs to continue their friendly policy towards the LTTE. They strongly believed that the government lacked the strength to bring the war to a successful conclusion. The Norwegians asserted the LTTE had the wherewithal to cause a battlefield stalemate by either rolling back the Army or resorting to guerrilla tactics. Solheim should peruse Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace effort in Sri Lanka 1997-2009 and make available copy to Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.
To be continued on Feb 17
UN Human Rights Commissioner Zeid Hussein has just wrapped up a four day visit to Sri Lanka. During the course of his visit Hussein reportedly held discussions a wide range of people. The photos below highlight a couple constituencies he met with that particularly interest me. The first, two of the country’s most respected Buddhist leaders, Chief Prelates of the Malwathu and Asgiri Chapters, the Most Venerable Sumangala and Aththadassi Thera.
The second a group of Tamil civilians, who Hussein met at a welfare centre situated inside one of the numerous IDP camps that still pockmark the north of the country. Hussein’s message to them: I hope to see you living back in your own lands next time I visit. The face of the women below suggests that almost seven years after the war’s end, belief that this will actually happen someday soon sits more on the UN Commissioner’s side than hers.
Hussein concluded the visit with a press conference at which he delivered a lengthy, rousing and generally excellent statement. The report below gives a flavour of the overall message. One paragraph, however, particularly caught my attention. I think it offers real insight into both the challenges confronting Sri Lanka for genuine healing of the wounds of its decades-long conflict: and prospective solutions. Here it is:
“If mistakes are made, or significant problems are downplayed or ignored during the first few years, they become progressively harder to sort out as time goes on. While the glass is still molten, if you are quick and skilful, you can shape it into a fine object that will last for years. Once it starts to harden in misshapen form, it becomes more and more difficult to rectify. Likewise if any of the four key elements of post conflict resolution — truth-telling, accountability, reparations and institutional reform — are neglected or mishandled, unresolved resentments will fester, new strains will emerge, and a tremendous opportunity to establish long-term stability, which in turn should result in greater prosperity, will be lost.”
Here’s the news report:
Extreme nationalistic tendencies lay at the heart of Sri Lanka’s conflict, and they should not be allowed to undermine the country’s long term chances of recovery once again, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein said today.
Addressing the media in Colombo at the end of his visit to Sri Lanka, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein noted that a year ago, large numbers of Sri Lankans voted for change, for reconciliation, for truth, for justice and it would be a great shame if a minority of extreme voices — on both sides — who are bent on disruption, were allowed to prevail by creating fear where there should be hope.
“Sri Lanka needs a serious debate about these very serious issues, on which its future depends. This needs to start with a thorough, frank and honest discussion of the detailed findings of the September 2015 UN report, as it is important that all Sri Lankans rally behind the process and better understand the point of view of all the victims on all sides,” he said.
He also said that repairing the damage done by a protracted conflict is a task of enormous complexity, and the early years are crucial.
“If mistakes are made, or significant problems are downplayed or ignored during the first few years, they become progressively harder to sort out as time goes on. While the glass is still molten, if you are quick and skilful, you can shape it into a fine object that will last for years. Once it starts to harden in misshapen form, it becomes more and more difficult to rectify. Likewise if any of the four key elements of post conflict resolution — truth-telling, accountability, reparations and institutional reform — are neglected or mishandled, unresolved resentments will fester, new strains will emerge, and a tremendous opportunity to establish long-term stability, which in turn should result in greater prosperity, will be lost,” he said.
He said that his visit has been a much more friendly, cooperative and encouraging visit than the one his predecessor endured in August 2013, which was marred by vituperative attacks on her integrity, simply because she addressed a number of burning human rights issues that any High Commissioner for Human Rights would have raised at that time.
He also said that the number of torture complaints has been reduced but new cases continue to emerge — as two recent reports, detailing some disturbing alleged cases that occurred in 2015, have shown — and police all too often continue to resort to violence and excessive force.
(Colombo Gazette)
Quelle abômination! No wonder the #JeSuisCirconflexe hashtag is already spreading comme la foudre . . .
And what on earth comes next? A friend suggests the following. “2015: oignon. 2016: ognon. 2030: le truk ki fe´ pleure´ …”
From The Guardian, 5 Feb. 2016
#JeSuisCirconflexe campaigners fight back against decision by the Académie Française to ‘fix anomalies’ and scrap the circumflex accent
French linguistic purists have voiced online anger at the loss of one of their favourite accents – the pointy little circumflex hat (ˆ) that sits on top of certain vowels.
Changes to around 2,400 French words to simplify them for schoolchildren, such as allowing the word for onion to be spelled ognon as well as the traditional oignon, have brought accusations the country’s Socialist government is dumbing down the language.
Nothing provokes a Gallic row than changes to the language of Molière, but the storm took officials by surprise as the spelling revisions had been suggested by the Académie Française, watchdogs of the French language, and unanimously accepted by its members as long ago as 1990.
The aim was to standardise and simplify certain quirks in the written language making it easier to learn (among them chariot to charriot to harmonise with charrette, both words for a type of cart and the regrouping of compound nouns like porte-monnaie/portemonnaie (purse), extra-terrestres/extraterrestres and week-end/weekend, to do away with the hyphen.
While the “revised spelling list” was not obligatory, dictionaries were advised to carry both old and new spellings, and schools were instructed to use the new versions but accept both as correct.
The reforms provoked a #JeSuisCirconflexe campaign (derived from the #JeSuisCharlie hashtag) on Twitter. As the row spread across the internet and social networks, some wondered why the reforms, decided 26 years ago, had suddenly become such an issue.
In 2008, advice from the education ministry suggested the new spelling rules were “the reference” to be used, but it appears few people took notice. Last November, the changes were mentioned again in another ministry document about “texts following the spelling changes … approved by the Académie Française and published in the French Republic Official Journal on 6 December 1990”. Again, the news went unremarked.
It was only when a report by television channel TF1 appeared on Wednesday this week that the ognon went pear-shaped.
A furious student union group issued a statement lambasting education minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem for “believing she was authorised to overturn the spelling rules of the French language”.
The far-right Front National waded in with party vice president Florian Philippot declaring “the French language is our soul” and the centre right mayor of Nice Christian Estrosi calling the reforms “absurd”.
The growing fury forced the education ministry in France to reassure the public on Friday that the circumflex accent was not disappearing, and that even though school textbooks would be standardised to contain the new spellings, pupils using either would be given full marks.
“It’s just that the publishers of schoolbooks have got together and decided to apply the reforms as of the next school year,” the education ministry said.
Le Parisien declared the reforms “impossible to apply”. Pierre Favre, school headmaster and president of the National Schools Union, said he hoped “wisdom would prevail”
“What makes this subject so controversial is that people are passionate about it. To change spelling touches on their childhood, reminds them of the pain, the effort, the successes needed to learn the rules and triumph. The circumflex accents are a kind of trophy,” Favre added.
Some pointed out that the i-less ognon sounds less like a vegetable and more like ‘oh non’, which pretty much summed up France’s reaction to the changes.
“This has been the official spelling in the Republic for 25 years. What is surprising is that we are surprised,” said Michel Lussault, president of the school curriculum board.
“There were strange spelling anomalies linked to historic shifts so the Académie really made sure these changes were understandable,” he said.
It was not an upheaval, he added, more a “clean-up”.
When making the new spelling recommendations in 1990, the then “perpetual secretary” of the Académie Française Maurice Druon wrote that “language is a living thing,”, adding: “Work should begin again in 30 years, if not earlier.”
Oignon becomes ognon (onion)
Nénuphar becomes nénufar (waterlily)
S’entraîner becomes s’entrainer (to train)
Maîtresse becomes maitresse (mistress or female teacher)
Coût becomes cout (cost)
Paraître becomes paraitre (to appear)
Week-end becomes weekend (weekend)
Mille-pattes becomes millepattes (centipede)
Porte-monnaie becomes portemonnaie (wallet)
Des après-midi becomes des après-midis (afternoons)
Source: TF1