An ugly victory

An ugly victory

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Jubilant: President-elect Trump. John Locher AP/Press Association Image

This is not a moment when considered analysis or reaction comes easily. But this piece makes a pretty good stab at attempting to understand the phenomenon that is Donald Trump. As Liam Kennedy suggests below:

‘Trump embodies that most American of American archetypes: the huckster or “confidence man”, a figure with a long history in American culture, dating from at least the early 19th century. He is a charlatan whose schemes invariably fail. In the end he skips town, leaving those he has scammed to learn their lesson…..

Right now, Trump’s victory should remind us just how fragile the social and political order we take for granted is – and how quickly an advanced democracy can be dragged into barbarism.’

After poisoning and dividing America, Donald Trump has won an ugly victory

Liam Kennedy , The Conversation, 9 November 2016

It’s over: Donald Trump will be the 45th president of the United States. The election that elevated him to this office has been brutal, ugly and bizarre. It has poisoned the well of American democracy, and the toxins it has introduced are unlikely to disperse anytime soon.

Trump has eagerly led a mass abandonment of civility and reason, breached social proprieties and political protocols, and normalised prejudice and brazen dishonesty.

The nation is now so divided that Democrats and Republicans are unable to agree on what constitutes factual reality. Dark rhetoric implying violent retribution against “certain groups” courses through the air. How did it come to this? When historians look back at this election what will they make of of the Trump campaign and its legacy? Will it be remembered as a one-off, or will they pronounce him an agent of a revolution in the Republican Party – or indeed, in America at large?

In truth, the sickness this election has brought to the surface has been brewing for a long time. Trump is a symptom, not just a pathogen. He has shown a genius for channelling the grievances and insecurities of those disaffected by economic and social changes in the US – primarily, though not solely, working-class whites. With this uncanny skill, he has magnified a form of identity politics the Republicans have long been using to appease and mobilise their base.

This experiment in political engineering began in earnest back in the early 1990s. It was until recently an insidious thing, usually advanced via dog-whistle tactics. Trump has picked it up and turned into a blunt instrument as he doubled down on his pursuit of a core white vote and eschewed any serious appeals to minorities.

But on a structural level, Trump’s victory is every bit of a piece with the way American politics now works. There’s abundant evidence that the choices of the US electorate are increasingly shaped by demographics, but there are underlying cultural dynamics at work too. This picture of extreme divisions is why getting out the core vote, rather than changing wavering voters’ minds with earnest appeals, is the ultimate device for winning an election.

The resulting focus on polarised core groups has exacerbated the crippling polarisation that wracks the US today – and the increasingly intense contempt in which Democrats and Republicans hold each other. Again, Trump did not create this divisive partisanship, but he has eagerly inflamed and manipulated it to his own ends.

The trickster

None of this means he will in fact serve the interests of the people who’ve elected him. Trump embodies that most American of American archetypes: the huckster or “confidence man”, a figure with a long history in American culture, dating from at least the early 19th century. He is a charlatan whose schemes invariably fail. In the end he skips town, leaving those he has scammed to learn their lesson.

The confidence man is often a comic figure. He crops up in Herman Melville and Mark Twain’s satirical depictions of a rampantly commercial republic. Sometimes he’s no more than a fast-talking, comic disrupter – think Sergeant Bilko or even the Cat in the Hat.

Would I lie to you? EPA/Jim Lo Scalzo

But the confidence man comes in darker manifestations too. He not only plays with other people’s trust, he abuses it to rob or demean them. Tricksters like Trump tell people what they want to hear, articulate desires not commonly expressed, and capitalise on their gullibility.

The Trump campaign was just such a trick. The disaffected and angry among the American electorate are Trump’s mark, his suckers. All he asked was that they trust him.

To his supporters, enraged by a dishonest, manipulative “Washington”, Trump “tells it like it is”. Many of them have lost faith in public institutions, and despise the country’s elites – and yet, in their search for an honest champion, they have gladly invested their confidence in Trump.

Onward and downward

Never mind the gridlock that has dogged the government during the Obama administration – what’s coming now will be deeply ugly. Trump’s campaign has radically upped the ante for distemper and dysfunction. The Republicans, who apparently still hold both the House and the Senate, will continue to throw red meat to Trump’s angry base. They might do well to recall Trump’s own idea: “You’ll have to have riots to go back to where we used to be, when America was great.”

Trump is an opportunist, not an ideologue – and he certainly isn’t driven by deep political convictions. Some claim he didn’t actually intend to make a protracted and successful run for the presidency, that he was seeking to promote his brand on the cheap, and that his ego simply took over once he was hijacked by his own success. Perhaps – but this overlooks the fact that he several times considered a tilt at the presidency, and it probably overstates just how much his campaign relied on improvisation and happenstance rather than something genuinely knowing.

While many found Trump’s approach risible even to the end, it was strikingly effective from the off – and, while he stumbled many times, the underlying instinct to “go low” became a distressingly effective strategy.

What’s the lesson of all this? The historians will one day be able to offer a longer view on that one. Right now, I suggest that Trump’s victory should remind us just how fragile the social and political order we take for granted is – and how quickly an advanced democracy can be dragged into barbarism.

Professor Liam Kennedy is Director of the Clinton Institute for American Studies at University College, Dublin, Ireland.




Brexit And After

Here’s my latest column for The Indian Economist:

Was Brexit An Emotional Decision?

Has the Brexit referendum only been successful in unleashing rage and violence against different communities in the UK, making everyone including Brits insecure?

A recent visit to Britain produced plenty to think about. Over four months since the referendum that delivered a narrow vote in favour of the UK leaving the European Union (EU), the outcome remains a, if not the dominant topic of political discussion. This is hardly surprising given that both the modalities and wider implications of the ‘Brexit’ vote are still being worked out.

Mirroring the outcome, discussions with friends and colleagues produced some real surprises. In brief, a number of them (admittedly small) voted for Brexit. A declaration of interest is in order: I regard myself as a thoroughly Europeanized, not to say internationalised Brit, and proud of it. And accordingly, my ‘filter bubble’ mostly comprises people on the same wavelength. Nevertheless, learning that an old friend who’s as cosmopolitan as they come, voted in favour of Brexit came as a shock. What on earth is going on in the country I still consider mine?

Referendums in focus

The referendum has become a key tool for the ‘direct’ delivery of the people’s verdict.

Here are three insights culled from my attempts to answer that question. First, it’s time to revisit the question of referendums. On the back of declining popular trust in representative democracy, the appeal of an alternative ‘direct democracy’ approach has undoubtedly increased. The referendum has become a key tool for the ‘direct’ delivery of the people’s verdict.

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In the Hungarian referendum, plurality voted to reject EU plans, but poll numbers were too low to be valid. | Source: Deutsche Welle

Across the globe, it has indeed been quite a year for the referendum. Alongside the Brexit vote, a peace deal to end Colombia’s civil war has been rejected; a new constitution that significantly limits democracy has been voted through in Thailand; and plans to reject EU requirements for accepting refugees have been approved in Hungary – though thankfully low turnout meant the referendum result was invalidated.

In all cases, the fact that voters herded through decisions with huge implications, while not necessarily enjoying a clear understanding of the issues at hand, induces a real pause for thought.

‘Take Back Control’, the Brexiteers shouted endlessly. ‘It’s the Economy Stupid’, screamed Remain in reply.

Looking closely at the recent UK experience makes matters clearer. The argument that it offers a textbook demonstration of the way in which politicians can refashion a complex issue – in this instance, the benefits or otherwise of continued EU membership – as a straightforward choice gathers steam. ‘Take Back Control’, the Brexiteers shouted endlessly. ‘It’s the Economy Stupid’, screamed Remain in reply. And so it went on – plenty of heat generated with little, if any, resultant light. And all in the name of respecting the people’s choice.

Is this democracy? As Professor Kenneth Rogoff commented following the UK referendum,

‘The idea that any decision reached anytime by majority rule is necessarily ‘democratic’ is a perversion. This isn’t democracy; it is Russian roulette for republics’.

If Rogoff is right, then, does the EU referendum qualify as British democracy’s worst hour?

Immigration

A survey found that post-referendum, crimes committed against people due to their race or religion rose by 41 per cent.

A second insight concerns the role of immigration. The facts speak for themselves. A recently published survey found that post-referendum, crimes committed against people due to their race or religion rose by 41 per cent. Eastern Europeans, in particular, Poles, have undoubtedly been the target of a mounting campaign of vitriol and abuse. This has resulted in growing numbers fleeing the country.

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In the aftermath of Brexit, violence in the name of race and religion has been on the rise. | Source: Independent UK

Take the case of Joanna Kalinowksa, as reported in a recent BBC programme. “I was talking to my daughter [in Polish]’, Joanna recalls. ‘A man passed and said ‘if you are in England you have to talk in English… otherwise you go back to your country’. I said, ‘I am talking with my child, so I will talk in my language. And this is also my country, and I have equal rights here’. The man answered: “You don’t have any rights here anymore.” ‘That was my experience after Brexit’. Is this emblematic of the direction in which Britain is headed? And if it is, what’s to be done about it?

Within the UK Asian community, too, there are voices expressing concern over the impact of the Brexit vote. In a recent Hindustan Times column, for example, Sunny Hundal argues that the message from UK Prime Minister Theresa May to India’s ‘brightest and best’ is this: ‘‘You’re not welcome anymore’. And she’s right’, he suggests, ‘They are not welcome anymore.’

The impending clampdown on immigration promised by the Brexiteers, Hundal argues, will hit not only Indians seeking work in the UK but also those wanting to study, visit or join family living there. Furthermore, he also points out, it will hit Indian companies looking to invest in Britain.

Building walls of isolation

All in all, it’s a measure of the depths of mistrust the referendum campaign has stirred up that Hundal references Enoch Powell and his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech as a benchmark for discussing contemporary UK race relations.

What exactly are the causes of this collective UK turn inwards? Intriguingly, Dutchman Joris Luyendijk suggests that the explanation lies in a kind of visceral post-imperial retreat into narcissism. ‘Rather than accepting itself as a country dependent on its neighbours like the rest of us, the English got lost in themselves, and then chose isolation.’ Only this time, he argues, ‘it will not be splendid.’

Post-truth politics

In this scenario, ‘facts’ no longer occupy centre-stage.

The final insight concerns the notion of ‘post-truth politics’. What? You may be asking: isn’t politics supposed to be about truth? Verifiable economic facts, empirically informed policy proposals and so on? Welcome to the new/old politics – as demonstrated in the EU referendum. In this scenario, ‘facts’ no longer occupy centre-stage. What matters is what you, I and everyone else feels about the issue.

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The Leave-campaign was inspired by the Trump style, playing the emotions card while underplaying facts. | Source: Vanity Fair

An excellent essay by Katherine Viner makes the point succinctly. A few days after the EU vote, she notes, Arron Banks, chief funder of the Leave campaign, told the Guardian that his side knew all along that ‘facts’ would not win the day.

[We were] taking an American-style media approach. What [we] said early on was ‘Facts don’t work’, and that’s it. The Remain campaign featured fact, fact, fact.. — It just doesn’t work. You have got to connect with people emotionally. It’s the Trump success.

So forget facts. Go for gut feeling. With Trump as your inspiration. Not a savoury conclusion regarding the way the Brexiteers manoeuvred themselves into the realm of hard political ‘fact’. But revealing, perhaps, of the wider world in which we find ourselves today.


Mark Salter is a journalist, writer and researcher.




War is peace: on bombing Syria aid convoys

War is peace: on bombing Syria aid convoys

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The scene the morning after a convoy delivering aid was hit by a deadly airstrike in Syria. Photograph: Omar Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty Images

Sovietspeak is still alive and well, it seems. The Russian Foreign Ministry is claiming that the nearly 20 Aleppo aid convoy trucks reportedly hit by airstrikes outside Aleppo yesterday (see below) weren’t in fact: they claim, they simply ‘caught fire’. Brezhnev – and indeed Stalin – would have been proud of that line.

At the same time, I’ve just digested this take on the latest developments in Syra from a well-informed ‘insider’ regional anlysis:

“Both Russia and the Syrian regime will continue to use subsequent ceasefires to solidify gains against the Syrian opposition in Aleppo City, and to employ siege-and-starve tactics to force the defeat of the opposition in critical terrain. Russia will continue to exert pressure on the US and the international community by escalating levels of violence in order to extract concessions in negotiations over the Syrian Civil War.”

Which suggests that the prospects for an end to the fighting are a lot slimmer – and the consequences of this considerably grimmer – than intimated by mainstream media portrayals of the Syria conflict. In the midst of all this, particularly with respect to the UN’s hapless role in the conflict, combined with official – in this instance meaning Russian/Syrian government forces’ – aerial bombing of civilian targets, I continue to be haunted by the eerie parallels with the final stages of the Sri Lankan conflict.

Russian planes dropped bombs that destroyed UN aid convoy, US officials say

If confirmed, the claim of direct Russian involvement in the bombing that killed at least 20 people in Syria would have far-reaching consequences.

The Guardian, Julian Borger and Spencer Ackerman, 21 Sept. 2016

US defence officials now believe that Russian planes dropped the bombs that destroyed a UN aid convoy and killed at least 20 people, the Guardian has learned.

The claim of direct Russian involvement in the bombing, if confirmed, would have far- reaching consequences. Earlier on Tuesday, Ban Ki-moon used his farewell address to the UN general assembly to denounce it as a “sickening, savage and apparently deliberate attack”, describing the bombers at “cowards”, and UN officials have said it is a potential war crime.

The outgoing secretary general told world leaders in New York that the UN had been forced to suspend aid convoys in Syria because of Monday’s attack on Syrian Red Crescent trucks that were carrying UN food supplies to a rural area west of Aleppo city.

Victims of the attack included the local director of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Omar Barakat. Ban hailed the dead aid workers as heroes and said “those who bombed them were cowards” before calling for accountability for crimes committed in the war. “Just when you think it cannot get any worse, the bar of depravity sinks lower,” he said.

Aid officials said the convoy was hit from the air while food and medicine were being unloaded at a warehouse in opposition-controlled Urem al-Kubra.

Reuters news agency quoted two US officials as saying two Russian Sukhoi SU-24 warplanes were in the sky above the aid convoy at the precise time it was struck.

The White House and state department said they could not confirm the allegations, while the Russian foreign ministry rejected them with “resentment and indignation”.

Previously, US officials had said that they would hold Moscow responsible for the attack, even if it was carried out by Syrian aircraft, as Russia had taken responsibility for the regime’s compliance with the ceasefire as part of the 9 September agreement.

But Moscow has not conceded that the convoy was hit by an airstrike, claiming instead that the 18 lorries had “caught fire”. In a separate statement on Tuesday, the country’s defence ministry said that the aid convoy had been accompanied by a militants’ pickup truck armed with a heavy mortar, Russian news agencies reported.

The US officials said there was no doubt the convoy was destroyed in an airstrike and that western coalition forces had no role in it.

“There are only three parties that fly in Syria: the coalition, the Russians and the Syrian regime. It was not the coalition. We don’t fly over Aleppo. We have no reason to. We strike only Isis, and Isis is not there. We would leave it to the Russians and the Syrian regime to explain their actions,” said Capt Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman.

In a meeting with John Kerry, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, admitted that the Russian military had been monitoring the convoy – apparent drone surveillance footage of its progress had been live-streamed on a defence ministry website . But he claimed the Russians had “lost track of it when it entered rebel territory”, according to diplomatic sources. Moscow had launched an investigation, Lavrov told the other foreign ministers.

Later on Tuesday, however, the Russian foreign ministry put out an angry denunciation of allegations against Moscow and Damascus.

Aftermath of airstrike on Syrian aid convoy – video

“We are considering, with resentment and indignation, attempts by some foreign curators of rebel units and terrorists in Syria to put the blame for the incident on the Russian and Syrian air forces who allegedly bombarded a relief convoy,” the statement said, according to the Tass news agency.

Despite the outrage caused by the attack, and the continued bombing of rebel-held areas of Aleppo, the US and Russia have refused to declare the Syrian ceasefire dead.

Lavrov’s meeting with the US secretary of state was the first since the Syrian military declared itself no longer bound by the ceasefire the two politicians negotiated, and resumed its air campaign against eastern Aleppo and other rebel-held areas on Monday.

Lavrov and Kerry talked in a central New York hotel for about half an hour on Tuesday morning before walking, still in deep discussion, into a broader session with other foreign ministers from the security council, Europe and the Middle East who make up the International Syria Support Group (ISSG). Kerry emerged from the group’s meeting insisting: “The cease fire is not dead.”

“We are going to continue to work. We are going to meet again Friday on some specific steps,” the secretary of state said.

Boris Johnson, the UK foreign secretary, said: “Quite frankly, the Kerry-Lavrov process is the only show in town and we have to get that show back on the road.”

The UN later retreated from the claim that the convoy had been targeted in an airstrike. “We are not in a position to determine whether these were in fact airstrikes. We are in a position to say that the convoy was attacked,” its humanitarian spokesman, Jens Laerke, said.

The ISSG foreign ministers are due to convene again on Friday, though diplomats said the session could be brought forward to Thursday evening, as fighting intensified in Syria.

The bombardment of eastern Aleppo continued until 2am on Monday, according to reports from the city. At least 39 civilians were killed overnight in Aleppo and the surrounding province, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group said, compared with 27 killed over the whole week when the truce was precariously in force.

In another incident late on Tuesday, four medical workers were killed and a nurse critically injured in an airstrike that hit a clinic in a village near Aleppo. The clinic in Khan Touman was completely levelled in the strike and more dead were feared to be buried under the rubble, the aid group that supports the clinic said. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group said Syrian or Russian warplanes carried out the raid.

The UN special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, said that none of the foreign ministers in the ISSG meeting had wanted to call an end to the ceasefire despite the renewed bombing, and the attack on the food convoy.

De Mistura described the targeting of the convoy as “outrageous” and hoped it would turn out to be “a gamechanger that will help Friday be a serious meeting about how to reinstall the cessation of hostilities [and] humanitarian aid”.

“The ceasefire is not dead. That I can tell you,” the Swedish envoy added. “It was confirmed by everyone around the table. The ceasefire is in danger. The ceasefire has been seriously affected but the only ones who can announce that the ceasefire is dead are the two co-chairs and they have today not done so. They want to give it another chance.”

The UN emergency relief coordinator, Stephen O’Brien, said that if it was found the convoy had been deliberately targeted, it would constitute a war crime.

Peter Maurer, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) president, said: “Yesterday’s attack was a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and it is unacceptable. Failing to protect humanitarian workers and structures might have serious repercussions on humanitarian work in the country.”

Robert Mardini, the ICRC director for the Middle East and north Africa, confirmed that Barakat, the Aleppo director for the Syrian Red Crescent, was among the dead.

“The team is in shock,” Mardini told Reuters. “Omar was badly injured and the rescue team could not reach him for two hours. When he was evacuated he could not survive his wounds.”

Plans for aid convoys to rebel-besieged Foua and Kefraya in Idlib, and government-blockaded Madaya and Zabadani near the Lebanese border, had been put on hold, he said.

The US state department spokesman John Kirby said that the US, Russia and other ISSG ministers had agreed to keep up attacks on Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, formerly the al-Qaida affiliated al-Nusra Front, “while recognising the difficulties of separating al-Nusra from the moderate opposition in some areas of the country”.

“They emphasised, in this context, the imperative of ending indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilians, which is exploited by terrorist groups. And they stressed the absolute criticality of creating the conditions necessary to resume UN-led political talks in coming weeks,” Kirby said.




Norway and Sri Lanka’s Peace Process: towards an honest assessment

Norway and Sri Lanka’s Peace Process: Towards an honest assessment

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The debate on Norway’s role in Sri Lanka’s utimately failed peace process continues. My latest contribution is in today’s issue of The Island newspaper.

The Island, September 18, 2016

After the brickbats of recent exchanges on the subject, it is refreshing to see Izeth Hussain’s considered assessment (The Island, 6 Sept.) of Norway’s role in the Sri Lankan peace process.

In sum, Hussain contends that the Norwegians carried out their mandate as official peace facilitators in a serious, honourable and responsible manner. It is particularly salient to hear such sentiments being expressed by a senior former government official. It reminds us that for all the mudslinging and stinging criticism of Oslo’s role that assumed centre stage during the Rajapaksa era, much of Colombo officialdom has always held much more nuanced views on the subject.

In one sense, of course, this is hardly surprising, as it was – as Hussain notes – Chadrika Kumaratunga’s government that invited Oslo to serve as peace facilitators in the late 1990s: and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s administration that tasked Norway with orchestrating six rounds of talks with the LTTE, following the CFA’s signature in February 2002.

That said, I want to raise two queries – one minor, the other substantive – regarding Hussain’s analysis. First, he suggests that Oslo’s initial involvement occurred against a background of ‘public indignation’ over ‘alleged pro-LTTE sentiment in Norway’.

This is not a perception I have previously heard expressed – at least not with respect to this particular stage of the Norwegian engagement. Criticism of alleged pro-Tiger bias was certainly voiced from an early stage against envoy Erik Solheim in particular – chiefly as a consequence of the stream of images of him talking to Prabakharan that flooded the Sri Lankan media, from the time of his first high-profile encounter with the LTTE leader in November 2000 onwards.

And later on, of course, following Mahinda Rajapaksa’s ascent to power, attacking the ‘salmon eating busy-bodies’ from Oslo – to coin Mangala Samaraweera’s memorable phrase – became a staple diet of Sri Lankan politics: essentially a strategy of ‘when in doubt, blame in on the Norwegians’, as one Colombo official once described it to me.

All in all I think a ‘background of public indignation’ against the Norwegians is highly unlikely to have existed in the mid-late 1980s, if only for the simple reason that – absent its long-standing support for development projects around the country – Norway was essentially off the radar screens of media, less still public discourse, at this point in the conflict.

The more substantive claim I want to query is Hussain’s suggestion that the Norwegians ‘shared the mistaken assessment that the LTTE was invincible’ – an error that, he suggests, lay at the source of what eventually went wrong with the peace process.

Nothing I discovered during the course of researching my book on the peace process leads me to share this assessment. What the Norwegians definitely did think in the early-mid 2000s – in common, as Hussain notes, with all the other key actors in the peace process, the GoSL included – was that, even if it had wanted to, at this stage the Sri Lankan Armed Forces simply did not have the capability to achieve a military victory over the LTTE. And this fundamental assessment shifted only much later, towards the end of 2008. Solheim, for example, states that his own ‘take’ changed chiefly as a result of the views expressed by senior Indian officials in the course of autumn 2008.

Furthermore, I believe the initial Norwegian view was influenced by the fact that in 2000-2001, the LTTE’s initial peace overtures were made from what, in the aftermath of its retaking of Elephant Pass (April 2000) and devastating attack on Katunayake Airport (July 2001), represented the height of the Tiger’s military power. Seeking to enter peace talks from a position of military strength is, to say the least, an unusual phenomenon. It did, however, help to convince both Oslo and Colombo of the seriousness of the LTTE’s peace overtures.

Retrospective arguments that the LTTE’s eventual military defeat shows that the government, both could and should have focused on achieving victory on the battlefield all along, also ignore two further aspects of the equation. First, that by the late 1990s the SLAF had been trying – and failing – to defeat the Tigers for over 15 years, and at a tremendous cost in lives, resources and physical destruction. The peace option was pursued in part because by this stage, a growing section – probably a majority – of the population were simply exhausted with the war and were longing for its ending.

Second, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government, and with it the Norwegian facilitators, elected to pursue a negotiated settlement with the Tigers on the assumption that such as deal might – just might – be possible, and that as long as that remained the case a peace agreement was worth pursuing. In the prevailing circumstances, this was a reasonable, even courageous path to take: and in my view, nothing that happened subsequently detracts from this fact.

While I have spent much time in these columns explaining, and in some cases defending the Norwegian’s conduct in Sri Lanka, I am by no means an uncritical apologist for Oslo over its role in the conflict. My recent book [To End A Civil War: Norway’s Peace Engagement In Sri Lanka (Hurst, London, 2015)] devotes considerable attention to a critical assessment of the Norwegian facilitation effort. Here are some key lessons – positive and negative – highlighted there.

Bipartisan political support. Solheim and colleagues acknowledge that failure to secure bipartisan political support for the CFA and the subsequent peace talks ultimately proved to be the process’ Achilles heel. It meant, for example, that when the LTTE tabled their Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal in late 2003, while government ministers showed immediate understanding that this constituted a negotiating document (albeit a maximalist one), President Kumaratunga proceeded to declare a state of emergency and seize control of key government ministries, rendering forward movement with the peace process effectively impossible.

International support. Despite the implicit Indian support and establishment of the ‘Co-Chairs’ structure in 2003, the Norwegians recognize that they didn’t work hard enough to generate a bedrock of international support for their peace efforts in Sri Lanka. As ex-Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen expressed it, a “major failure in Norway’s approach to peace processes in general [is] insufficient attention to the design of an international support structure. When a peace process fails, there is a tendency to focus on Norway as having failed, not understanding the broader parameters. Post 9/11, while we were basically aware that negotiating with terrorists was a difficult thing, we didn’t do enough to ‘massage’ the international community’s attitudes on the subject .”

“At the same time”, he continues, “the degree of – admittedly ‘soft’– support that Oslo was able to generate for its post 9/11 efforts to take forward a Sri Lankan process involving an internationally proscribed terrorist group– including, most strikingly, from the US Administration – remains nothing short of remarkable.”Prabakharan. A quotation from Erik Solheim well summarizes a key Norwegian conclusion regarding their interactions with the LTTE leader. “Contact with the LTTE should not have been restricted”, Solheim argues. “More high-level visits, more encounters with Prabhakaran would have helped. [The restrictions] were mainly due to the government: they were afraid of being attacked by the opposition, the media. But it was a big mistake. There should have been more visits: they would have had a very positive effect. We took LTTE delegations outside Sri Lanka, but with the exception of Balasingham or Tamilselvan they were not decision-takers. At the end of the day it was about Prabhakaran.”

In other words, more sustained international exposure to the LTTE leader might – just might – have served to help shift his views in the direction of support for a negotiated political settlement.

Communication. A criticism frequently leveled against the Norwegians – and the UNP government of the time – concerns their failure to communicate with the public over the peace process, and thereby to help foster a vital ingredient of any sustainable settlement: a broad-based popular constituency that both understands and supports it. Here again, there is broad Norwegian recognition that the communication aspect of their facilitation effort could – and should – have been handled better. VidarHelgesen notes:

“Our softly,softly approach would have been OK if the government had had an inclusive approach towards civil society. But they didn’t. We should have had an overall media strategy. We tended to think that it was better not to respond. And while we couldn’t—and shouldn’t—have got into a position where we were having arguments with individual politicians or journalists, we should have reinforced our message and corrected mistakes and misrepresentations.”

Solheim’s thoughts on this issue are also worth noting: “In terms of reaching out, our biggest failing was probably with the Buddhist clergy. Reaching out to Buddhists would have meant reaching out to those who didn’t agree with us—regular visits to Kandy to talk to senior monks to pay our respects, listen politely. Which might also have given them a platform from which to attack the peace process—which in turn may be part of the reason Ranil and Chandrika did not want us to reach out to them.”

Pro-LTTE bias? On this most controversial issue – and one touched on by Hussain –Solheim explains his own position as follows: “I’m attacked by extremist Sinhalese –and Tamils as well. The latter claim I’m responsible for the death of Prabhakaran. We were the main contact point with the LTTE, so this perception of bias had to come sooner or later. I met Balasingham all the time, although actually we met the government far more. I had to explain the LTTE position and so was targeted in an environment where Sinhala supremacy was ingrained. Since no one else was presenting the LTTE view to international actors I had to do it. It is a perception one has to live with.”

Why Norway? Regarding Norway’s selection as external facilitator by both the GoSL and the LTTE, Solheim’s comments are again very much to the point: “The reason Norway was selected in the first place was that no one wanted the US, or anyone with a big stick, to be involved. Secondly, no one with a big stick wanted to be involved. The Indians had tried once. It was a war between the two parties in Sri Lanka, and [the parties] wanted someone lightweight: they wanted a way to communicate between themselves, not someone who could punish or carry a big stick. We had to think throughout about the way in which we could mobilise other forces. Even for big powers there were clear limitations on what kind of stick they could really use. It’s the same in many conflicts.”

Parity of status? On the vexed question of how the Norwegians facilitated the peace negotiations, ex-Indian High Commissioner to Colombo, Gopalkrishna Gandhi, offers the following thoughtful analysis: “I once had a discussion with Vidar and I asked him, how is it that you are able to reconcile giving parity to a state and a non-state entity? He said: We are not treating state and non-state parties as equals, but around the discussion table there is no difference between the discussants. That was a very interesting response. It also said something of the Norwegians’ methodology. On one side a state with a policy that by its own admission needed modifications in order to move forward; and on the other, a non-state entity with a cause overlaid by a method that was anathema to all civilised nations.”

There are, of course, many other important lessons to be drawn from the Norwegian engagement. But my hope is that those highlighted here will help to foster further reflection even today, for example concerning the need for bipartisan political support for peace efforts – an issue that remains highly relevant to the current political situation.

More broadly, in putting the spotlight on a principled approach to addressing and resolving the issues and grievances at the root of the Sri Lankan conflict, my hope is that consideration of these lessons can contribute to the elaboration of the way forward as Sri Lanka continues along the path of developing and implementing its own vital, and unique, transitional justice process.

Mark Salter

 




On Being Mark Salter

Here’s my latest piece. This time with a rather different focus from my usual fare.

On Being Mark Salter

A senior advisor to US Republican Senator John McCain. NGAN/AFP/Getty Images

Presidential Elections in America: And a rather interesting case of mistaken identity.

The Indian Economist, September 7, 2016

By Mark Salter

So here’s the thing. I’ve never considered my name anything special. Just another regular moniker, nothing special to attract attention. As for the rest – fine, I’ve written a couple of books, done the odd public thing over the years. But famous? I hardly think so.

But it turns out that I was wrong.

It all started during this spring. Out of nowhere, a number of emails arrived from various US media outlets – fairly obscure ones though in the main – asking me if I’d be happy to be interviewed on my views on Donald Trump’s bid to become the Republican presidential candidate? Not knowing quite how to react to what might prove to be an – admittedly unusual – case of spamming, before responding I did the obvious thing; I googled myself.

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Donald Trump: The Republican Party 2016 presidential nominee. Photo Courtesy: Gage Skidmore via Flickr

The man responsible for the controversial remarks was a guy called Mark Salter.

And I was in for a surprise! Up near the top of the search results were reports of a recent interview with US Senator John McCain’s speechwriter, urging Republicans to vote for Hilary Clinton in the upcoming presidential elections. Clearly, some hot stuff going down in the Washington bear pit. But to stop here would be to omit the story’s most salient aspect. The man responsible for the controversial remarks was a guy called Mark Salter. And a serious sort of character he appeared to be too. Clearly, when Mark (is that what I should call him?) expressed the view that on balance, the Republic party faithful would be better off voting for the opposition candidate, Americans sat up and listened.

From there on, the faux publicity ball continued on something of a roll.

Interview requests from minor media outlets were followed by polite but urgent emails from the likes of Salon, Wall Street Journal, Fox News and CNN wanting me – or rather, him – to come and opine on the latest Trump controversy, explain why Republicans should vote Democrat this time around and so on.

By this stage, I had developed a standard approach – polite but short – while responding to the requests. But the CNN one, I must admit, got a bit different reply. “I’m not the man you’re looking for, but hey”, I quipped jocularly, “if you’d like someone to jet over to your New York Time Warner Studios to come and rap about the US elections, well, I’d be delighted to do so”.

Naturally, CNN didn’t take me up on this rather excellent proposal. But heck, it was worth a try. (I should add that in protest at their right-wing rabble rousing, Fox News got a token nothing from me in reply. And if they did manage to get hold of him, I sincerely hope that the ‘other me’ gave them a similar treatment.)

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Why should Republicans vote Democrat this time?  Photo Courtesy: U.S. Dept of State via Flickr

Then there were – and still are – the others, quite a lot of them in fact. Earnest college teachers wanting ‘me’ to come and talk to their students about the state of US politics; Jo Publics from Milwaukee and Wisconsin plying me with long, detailed accounts of the state of the country and why Donald Trump is not the right person to fix things in the White House; worried voters asking me things like this: ‘With the situation so dire, can you suggest how a moderate Republican (who voted for John McCain) without much money can make a difference?’ All in all, fairly reasonable stuff.

So far, it was all polite. But something shifted in the late spring. Into May and early June, I noted a marked increase in the number of politically barbed broadsides hitting my tray. Of course, those from Republicans who agreed with ‘my’ stand on who to vote for, come November were a mixture of the thankful and the congratulatory. “I just wanted to say ‘THANK YOU!’ for the public position you’ve taken on Donald Trump: from a Reagan/McCain Republican from Massachusetts” gushed one, for example.

Though, things were different on the other side of the political fence. First off, a self-professed, lifelong Republican chided me in the following terms: “You are acting like a spoiled child. You are acting like a traitor and any elite Republican who doesn’t vote or threatens to vote for Clinton is also a spoiled child. Grow up and start listening to the voters or people like you will be the downfall of the Republican party.” Phew! Am I really such a low-life, I wondered?

This, however, seemed like polite, dinner party conversation compared to the certified hate mail I received from some quarters. A lot of it is unprintable (you get the gist).

My response to one such message ran as follows: “Dear Mr B., you are the latest in an increasingly long line of disgruntled Republicans venting their spleen out on my US namesake. I stress ‘namesake’ since he is not I, nor am I he. Good luck with locating him!”. In the strange call-and-response game into which I had allowed myself to be pulled into, I was, in other words, beginning to enjoy myself a little.

Perhaps my favourite exchange to date was with a young guy in New York who wrote to inform me that we were fairly distantly related cousins, that he much admired my stand on Trump and what would I say to meeting up with him? Since his budget was a little stretched he couldn’t offer to take me out for dinner, but how would I feel about coffee, if he came down to see me for the purpose?

Charmed by this approach, I responded letting my would-be relative know that his distant cousin was to be found elsewhere.

Charmed by this approach, I responded letting my would-be relative know that his distant cousin was to be found elsewhere. Wishing him every luck in locating my alter ego, I informed him that I for one would be more than happy to meet him for coffee at some point if he ever found himself in my home city of Stockholm.

Came back a nearly instantaneous reply expressing profuse apologies for having got his Mark Salters mixed up. After pointing out that the absence of a subway line between his district of NY and Stockholm might render the coffee date a little hard to happen in practice, my new-found online friend finished by letting me know that having perused my website, he now planned on buying a copy of my latest book, on Sri Lanka, a subject about which he knew nothing but which, he felt sure would prove interesting nonetheless.

All very interesting but surely a bit of a one off, I can hear you say. Well, think again amigos. About British Prime Minister Teresa May for example. In advance of her selection as the Conservative party leader following David Cameron’s resignation in the wake of the Brexit referendum, it emerged that a lot of people were confusing her with someone else of the same name. And not just any old someone either. In response to the growing interest in her Twitter feed – ‘10 short of 10,000 followers now’ she informed us at one point – Theresa May No. 2 tweeted that she was a ‘UK glamour model, not the Prime Minister’. Which, it turns out was an oblique way of letting it be known that she had starred in some popular 1980s porn films. Amusing? You couldn’t have made that one up even if you tried.

What’s more, Terese May (UK Prime Minister that is) has clearly been here before. A BBC report from when she first became a government minister in the early 1990s notes that May had been receiving ‘numerous invitations’ that were obviously intended for her racier namesake.

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In the early 1990s Terese May received ‘numerous invitations’ that were intended for her racier namesake. | Photo Courtesy: barnyz via Flickr

“I have a suspicion that if people saw us together there might be other distinguishing characteristics”, suggested May’s deadpan reply regarding the activities of her shadow self. May went on to note demurely that she did indeed occasionally receive calls from ‘people wanting to book me to do programmes and so forth, which are perhaps not about politics’. All in all, I’d say she seems to have managed things pretty smoothly ever since.

Now, there are yet a couple of months to go until the US presidential elections, so who knows what will happen to ‘me’ in the meantime? Actually, there’s only one thing I’d truly like to see happen. One of these days I’d really like to meet the other me. Not to discuss Trump, Clinton and co. – although that would be interesting, of course. But no, I’d just like to talk about what it’s like being Mark Salter. Compare experiences, the goods and the bads, that sort of a thing.

Will it ever happen? I doubt it. But you never know. Meantime I’ll keep an eye on my email inbox. Because if he wants to, Mark Salter will know where to find me now.


Mark Salter is a writer and researcher focusing on issues of democracy, conflict, reconciliation and diversity management.

 

 

 




Reconciliation and Peace Processes

Reconciliation and Peace Processes

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A Belfast Mural from after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

A new issue of Conciliation Resource‘s Accord Insight Series, titled ‘Reconciliation and Peace Processes‘, is just out. Now the personal interest confession: I am the Guest Editor of this excellent new publication.

If you’ve an interest in the role of reconciliation in efforts to resolve the conflicts in Colombia, the Philippines/Mindanao, Nolrthern Ireeland or Georgia/Abkhazia- the four case studies covered in the report – or broader issues regarding the relationship between reconciliation and peace proceeses, then this spanking new publication is the one for you!

Below is a sectjon taken the Report’s Introduction

Making peace with the past: transforming broken relationships

Policymakers and practitioners increasingly acknowledge the importance of reconciliation to sustainable peace. Yet it is often viewed belatedly, as a purely post-conflict concern. There is uncertainty about what type of reconciliation activity is possible at different phases of a peace process, and how to connect initiatives at different levels – from grassroots to elite.

This third Accord Insight reflects on practical approaches and challenges to address the legacies of violent conflict. Case studies from the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, Colombia, Mindanao (Philippines) and Northern Ireland offer important insights into a diversity of approaches (successes and failures) in societies with different histories of violence and at very different stages on the conflict spectrum.

“The past is a central dimension of reconciliation. But reconciliation is essentially about the future: moving from a divided past towards a shared future. And so it means, at its core, building relations for the future” Dr David Bloomfield, Accord Insight expert contributor

“Reconciliation means much more than forgiving the perpetrator and understanding what happened; it implies ensuring that the conditions that gave rise to the conflict change deeply, and trusting that the state will never again cause or allow that situation to occur” Rosa Emilia Salamanca, Strategic Director, Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica (CIASE), Colombia

They illustrate the importance of a diverse range of efforts to support peace processes and the reconstruction of post-conflict societies, and stress the need to ‘transform relationships’ away from past antagonisms in order to secure a more peaceful future.

“Healing starts when those who acknowledge their violent acts propose how to ‘mend’ such wrongs. Accounting for past actions is an important element of healing and reconciliation; it is also among the first steps toward transforming relationships at different levels” Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Director of the Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao, Mindanao State University

***   A joint analysis workshop held in November 2015, which brought together 35 experts, policymakers, practitioners and stakeholders, greatly informed the analysis and conclusions of this Accord Insight publication. Read Accord Insight 3 issue editor Mark Salter’s workshop report here

Authors
Arda Inal-Ipa David Bloomfield Dr Alexander Ramsbotham Dr Rachel Clogg Dr Zahbia Yousuf Duncan Morrow Graeme Simpson Marina Elbakidze Mark Salter Ricardo Mendoza Rosa Emilia Salamanca Rufa Cagoco-Guiam

http://www.c-r.org/accord/reconciliation-and-peace-processes-insight




Staying On Message

Another week, another round in the recent debate in the columns of Sri Lanka’s The Island into which I’ve  unwittingly been dragged. At any rate, with any luck the barrage of criticism I’ve been receiving in those pages of latre will die down soon. We shall see.

For clarity’s sake, beneath my response I’m adding the article to which it was a reply.

Richard L. Armitage

Richard Armitage, Former US Deputy Secretary of State on a visit to Sri Lanka, here with President Sirisena. Photo: Asiantrubune.coma

Staying On Message

August 30, 2016

Vinod Moonesinghe (The Island, 29 Aug 2016) offers a, to say the least, curious take on the continuing debate on Norway’s role in Sri Lanka in these pages. First and foremost, because he deals with anything but the Norwegian peace facilitation effort.

What hedoes insteadis to is to lambast several of the people I cited or simply mentioned in my last article, chiefly for their actions everywhere other than in Sri Lanka, and on that basis suggest that readers should able to discern the – presumably pernicious – political interests ‘closest to [my] heart’.

Depressingly, in responding to me Moonesinghe resorts to an old propagandistic smear technique. In doing so he offers not a single word of analysis or critical response to the substance of my article, which focuses on Norwegian actions in Sri Lanka. Instead Moonesinghe lines up a supposed rogues gallery of people I have mentioned – people he somewhat bizarrely describes as ‘character witnesses’ for my ‘political view’ – and proceeds to execute a rapid – and error-prone – hachet job on their wider political affiliations and actions, past and present. The people in question are Richard Armitage, Jonathan Powell and David Milliband.

With regard to these men’s broader political sympathies I will offer little comment, bar three short observations. First that in dealing with all three, Moonesinghecontinues with his tiresomeresort to smear by association. Thus for example Richard Armitage is criticized for his association with the International Crisis Group – surely one of the most widely respected global think tanks around – as an organizationthat includes among its past advisers former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. In Moonesinghe’s worldview, moreover, Peres becomes a ‘Zionist ethnic cleanser’ – a truly ugly description that sits uncomfortably close to repellent, anti-Semitic slander.

Second, the account of David Milliband’s past actions is marred by a simpleerror. Moonesinghe writes of David Milliband’s brother and former Labour Party leader Edward Milliband: not the Labour Foreign Secretary at the time of the Sri Lankan war’s final stages in 2009: asilly and easily avoidable mistake.

Third, and most absurdly of all, Moonesinghe takes one descriptive phrase from a quotation I offer from Jonathan Powell’s book Talking To Terrorists as supposedly clear evidence of whose political interests are ‘closest to [my] heart ‘. As well as being insulting, this is both totally inaccurate and(again) a case of smear by highly convoluted association.

It also completely misreads what I take to be Powell’s main point, which is simply that history indicates that sooner or later, political establishments end up talking to precisely those they have previously designated as terrorists. (This by the way being very much the case with Shimon Peres, who stood on the White House lawn in 1993 and shook hands with PLO leader Yasser Arafat infront of the world’s media.)

So much for the guilt by association sleight of hand. What of the substance of my argument concerning Oslo’s actions in Sri Lanka? Here I have nothing to add because to repeat, amazingly there is simply nothing on the subject inMoonesinghe’s article.

I welcome the opportunity to discussand re-evaluate Norway’s role in the Sri Lankan conflict currently provided by the opinion pages of The Island. I hope, however, that future contributions will demonstrate a greater willingness to stay ‘on message’ regarding the subject in focus – and avoid simply seeking to shoot the messenger in the process.

Mark Salter

Here’s the article to which I was responding above.

Deadly witnesses of Mark Salter

August 29, 2016

Mark Salter (“Norway in Sri Lanka: in defence of negotiations”, The Island, 25 August) has a very curious collection of “character witnesses” for his point of view. They are:

(a) Former US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage: this Cold Warrior was allegedly involved in the Phoenix programme of murdering opponents of the USA in Vietnam, during the war on that country. He was later allegedly implicated in the Iran-Contra arms and drugs scandal. He was later associated with the right-wing think-tank, the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) centred on Donal Rumsfeld and responsible for plotting many of George W Bush’s neo-colonialist adventures, including the illegal invasion and conquest of Iraq. He has been on the board of CACI, a defence contractor implicated in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal. He was associated with the International Crisis Group, founded by fellow PNAC members Morton I Abramowitz and Stephen Solarz, one of the prime movers in the campaign against Sri Lanka, which had as its adviser the Zionist ethnic cleanser Shimon Peres.

(b) Tony Blair’s ex Chief of Staff and author of Talking To Terrorists, Jonathan Powell: a pillar of the British political establishment, he was one of the closest advisers to Tony Blair, the British half of the criminal invasion of Iraq. He was the only senior adviser to last through the Blair era. He was a member of the shadowy British American project for the Successor Generation, the right-wing think-tank founded by Ronald Reagan and Rupert Murdoch, and funded by far-right oil tycoon Howard Pew.

(c) David Miliband. The former Labour Party leader was an adviser to Tony Blair and voted in favour of the illegal invasion and conquest of Iraq. He was accused of having “fought tooth and nail” to thwart the release of documents relating to Benyam Mohammed, a detainee at the USA’s notorious Camp X Ray torture base at Guantanamo.

Apart from quoting such pristine paragons of human rights, Salter makes a slip which reveals his fundamental bias. He quotes Jonathan Powell as referring to the PLO as a “terrorist organisation”, and, while he says that Taliban could be added to that number, he does not mention the terrorist apartheid state of Israel. The PLO, as the ruling party of the independent and sovereign state of Palestine, is a legitimate political organisation much respected by the people of Sri Lanka.

I think the readers will be capable of evaluating precisely whose interests are closest to Salter’s heart.

Vinod Moonesinghe




Norway in Sri Lanka: in defence of negotiations

Norway in Sri Lanka: in defence of negotiations

LTTE’s leader Prabhakaran with Norway’s envoy Erik Solheim. Photo/Tamilnet

Here’s the latest installment of my contribution to a debate that’s been raging in the coloumns of Sri Lanka’s The Island over the last week. The immediate subject is Norwegian conduct in the aftermath of the assassination of Sri Lankan Froeign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005 – an event whose 11th anniversary fell earlier this month. More broadly, it’s about the role of facilitators and mediators in peace processes and what they should – and should not – try to do in that ocntext.

To be continued, I suspect . . ..

The Island, 24 August 2016

A voice from the Sinhala Diaspora, Bodhi Dhanapala (The Island, 22 August 2016), takes issue with my endorsement of Norway’s conduct following Lakshman Kadirgamar’s assassination in August 2005. In particular, Dhanapala criticizes Oslo’s focus on – and my endorsement of – efforts to get talks going again between the two sides, as opposed to his preferred course of action viz. fierce, vocal denunciation of the Tigers as terrorists combined with redoubled efforts to wipe them out. In sum, Dhanapala appears to regard my view as tantamount to defending what he describes as ‘moral bankruptcy and duplicity’. Moreover, he suggests, people like myself would never argue for such a course of action were a similar event to occur at home.

Dhanapala’s comparative scenario setting to illustrate his point is forced – Western foreign minister assassinated? What would a US Envoy do? – and in some respects too skewed to deal with here. (A history of ethnic discrimination mutating into a 30 year civil war and followed by an attempted peace process.) But one aspect of his imagined scenario is worth examining more closely: the presence of a hypothetical envoy in the form of the US Secretary of State.

First, it is important to stress (yet again) that the Norwegians were peace facilitators–not mediators, and most certainly not envoys. In formal terms their role, as defined by and agreed with both parties (Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), LTTE) was to facilitate talks between the parties, and specifically not to pressurize or otherwise strong-arm either of them i.e. play the strong mediator.

Strong mediator mandates exist – the US in the Middle East, for example. In Sri Lanka, however, as the GoSL – Kadirgamar himself included – made abundantly clear from the start, this was precisely what it did not want. The consequences of overstepping the mark were made very clear to Erik Solheim, who at an earlier stage was criticized strongly for both playing what was regarded as too prominent a role in the media and, for adopting a position viewed by some as overly sympathetic to the Tigers.

Finally here, it should be noted that a US (Deputy) Secretary of State, Richard Armitage was from the start highly supportive of Oslo’s engagement in Sri Lanka, their approach to dealing with the parties included. Generally speaking, a quid pro quo of taking on an external facilitator or a mediator role in a conflict is the need to be careful to avoid public statements directly condemning any of the parties – even if such a move would be thoroughly justified on its own merits, which it almost certainly would have been in this instance. In the international division of labour, with respect to a peace process, in other words, condemnation has to be left to others apart from the facilitators.

There is also plentiful evidence to suggest that at this point, as at every other up to this stage in the peace process, the Norwegian position and approach was closely co-ordinated with Colombo. For example, the call for redoubled efforts to restart talks that Dhanapala finds so repugnant, was closely mirrored in an 18 August GoSL letter to Prabakharan. (The details are laid out in my earlier article). And in this context, the fact that Oslo did not issue a loud denunciation of the murder would doubtless also have met with understanding in Colombo.

Dhanapala goes on to provide a gory list of LTTE atrocities, all appalling and most doubtless accurate – although claims that the LTTE ran orphanages to train Black Tigers as suicide cadres and indulged in wholesale killing of their wounded cadres in the war’s final stages are certainly questionable. With respect to a conflict known for its serial brutalities and atrocities, however, the point of providing this list is not entirely clear: particularly as reference to the litany of abuses committed by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, not least in the final stages of the conflict is absent, though Dhanapala is doubtless as aware of these as anyone.

The author’s eye-catching ISIS-LTTE comparison also raises as many questions as it answers. First of all, because the differences between the two outfits are at least as compelling as the similarities. To note a few obvious examples: a national/ethnic support base; a fundamentalist religious ideology; a charismatic leader figure; and external financial and military backing (the latter admittedly true of the Tigers during the 1980s). In fact, about the only thing ISIS and the LTTE can truly be said to have in common is an avowed taste for brutality, a ruthless propensity for using extreme violence against their opponents.

Beyond the problematic nature of the ISIS-LTTE comparison, however, one further thing in common is the eventual necessity of dealing with both through attempted negotiation – however challenging that is, as is clearly the case with ISIS. As Tony Blair’s ex Chief of Staff and author of Talking To Terrorists Jonathan Powell, argues.

‘The probability [is] that we will in the end have to talk to Isis. Every time we have met a terrorist group, we have said we will never talk to them; but from the original IRA in 1919 to Eoka in Cyprus, the FMLN in El Salvador, the Gam in Indonesia, the Milf in the Philippines, the PLO in Palestine and the Farc in Colombia, we have [always] ended up doing so’ (he might also have added the Taliban in Afghanistan)

Dhanapala again chastises me for defending what he calls the ‘indefensibly immoral position of the Norwegians’. I fail, however, to see the immorality of attempting to facilitate a peaceful resolution to a conflict that had already resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, while also saving many more innocent lives in the process – as the period during which the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was respected by both sides certainly did.

As Powell argues political realism no less than morality dictates that once resolving a destructive, bloody conflict comes into focus, the pursuit of dialogue and negotiation becomes both imperative and ultimately inescapable. This was definitely the case in Sri Lanka throughout the Norwegian engagement, and far from being immoral, in this sense it was a thoroughly praiseworthy effort, even if the peace process ultimately failed to achieve a lasting settlement.

Finally, Dhanapala turns his fire on David Milliband, British Foreign Minister at the time of the conflict’s final stages, upbraiding him for acting at the bidding of the domestic UK Tamil constituency, and allegedly with a view to ‘saving’ Prabakharan.

First, Dhanapala misunderstands the nature of Milliband’s ‘admission’ in the Wikipedia cable he mentions. Politicians should surely be attentive to the concerns of large domestic constituencies – which the Tamil Diaspora undoubtedly is in London, in particular. Acting in response to popular concerns– here meaning mounting public outrage over the appalling casualties being inflicted on a hapless Tamil civilian population corralled into a shrinking coastal pocket of the Northeast – is certainly no sin in a democracy. Indeed, politicians who fail to act in response to such pressures do so at their peril. And to suggest in this context that Milliband was acting primarily to try and save the LTTE leader is make-believe.

Rather, it seems reasonable to suggest that, like many in the West who by early 2009 were waking up to the scale of the tragedy engulfing northeast Sri Lanka, Kouchner and Milliband’s engagement with the Sri Lankan conflict was motivated primarily (but not exclusively) by humanitarian concern for the Tamil civilian population.

All in all, Dhanapala’s broadside suggests a deeply polarized, black and white view of the Sri Lankan conflict that is at odds with ground realities in the country, both then and today. As long as Mahinda Rajapaksa remained in power, similar views continued to dominate the country’s political outlook. With 2015’s decisive shift in governance, however, other more tolerant, peacefully orientated perspectives have begun to come to the fore. Crucially, these have found practical expression in the four-part set of transitional justice measures outlined in Geneva in October 2015 by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, and now gradually being rolled out, initially in the form of the recently established Office of Missing Persons (OMP). I think I can confidently assert, moreover, that this development has Norway’s full blessing and support.

Mark Salter




A Long Watch: The Capture of Commodore Boyagoda

A Long Watch: The Capture of Commodore Boyagoda

Here is a sensitive, thoughtful account of how her fascinating new book came to be by authoress Sunila Galiappatti. The book, A Long ‘Watch: The Capture of Commander Boyagoda, was recently released by Hurst, my own publishers in London. This article itself was originally published in The Wire.

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The Risks of Testimony: ‘Memories of Captivity with the Tamil Tigers

BY SUNILA GALAPPATTI

LTTE leaders at Sirumalai camp, Tamil Nadu, in 1984 while being trained by Indian Intelligence (RAW). Credit: Wikimedia CommonsThe framing of A Long Watch: War, Captivity and Return in Sri Lanka (Hurst, 2016) the memoir of the LTTE’s highest-ranking prisoner, Commodore Ajith Boyagoda, as told to authoress Sunila Galappatti.

It takes a long time to tell this story to friends: to say that I have a book just out; that I worked on it for five years without speaking openly about it; that it is a memoir written in the voice of a naval officer who was held captive for eight years during the Sri Lankan civil war and that he speaks of that experience in an understated and accepting way.­

This acceptance is the most surprising thing about the story and, almost immediately, people ask, “Did he go Stockholm?” I tell them it is a joke the commodore makes. “Maybe I have Stockholm syndrome,” he will say, and laugh. How is he to know, or I? We are not able to make a diagnosis, any more than the people who ask the question.

But over time I have wondered why this particular question recurs, of so many possible questions. There is inside it an urge to know – to be able to identify as something we recognise, a story that doesn’t fit the format we expect. There is a suggestion that we might know better than the man who is telling us his story. We are quick to make an illness of his survival strategies. Above all, we are schooled to resist the story being told.

§

I once asked similar questions. Five years ago, I was told there was this man. He had been an officer of the Sri Lankan navy who was captured and held for eight years by the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), during the middle decade of the island’s long civil war. He wanted to tell his story; might I be interested in working on it with him?

 

I was interested but cautious; I felt I had to know more about the commodore’s politics first. I am embarrassed now by the arrogance of this reserve, but I do not want to belittle it. I knew the story must be fundamentally personal to Commodore Boyagoda, as the war itself is personal to all of us associated with Sri Lanka. If the commodore’s feelings about the war and mine were opposite, we might struggle to work together. I hope unlikelier collaborations will indeed be forged, but I was not there yet. It was a question of what was possible in that time and place.

The first time I met the Commodore, he said a list of things that struck me:

He said, “This war was a mistake.”

He said, “We should have done a better job.”

He said, “People write about the LTTE all the time. I lived with them for eight years and no one ever asked me what they were like.”

“You come back and you want to go to the toilet and you look around for someone to ask. You can go insane,” he said.

“Why did it happen? Was it for a sin you did?”

What struck me most of all was the understated way that Commodore Boyagoda spoke. He told me that in one of the places he was held, the prisoners were “quite free”; meaning that they were not held in chains and could move around three rooms of a house, as long as they did not speak to each other or try to go outdoors. It was apparent to me that he was speaking from within his reality, not ours.

Occasionally, when he was moved at night, without blindfolds, he used his naval training to navigate by the stars. In his cell, he tried to work out the progress of a battle: from which direction were the shells coming? In which direction did ambulances travel afterwards? Ten years later, his memory of captivity served in turn as a prompt for piecing together the progress of war. None of this was told to me with the drama we perceive in it, but rather with a forceful pragmatism. I knew that that was precisely the tone and plain language in which I had to write the book, if it was to be a faithful account.

This instinct was reinforced by an everyday conversation I had sometime later – completely unrelated to the commodore’s story. I had moved for a short time to the east coast of Sri Lanka and had just found a room to rent. I went with my brother to pay a customary courtesy call on my landlord. It went as these conversations go. The landlord kindly offered us a cup of tea and introduced us to his mother-in-law. We spoke of our family to reassure him of our values and respectability. He spoke of his family and told us his son was just visiting from university in the US. This reminded him of his own travels as a young man: he recollected that time and, to account for it, mentioned that his sister had worked for an airline, enabling his travel. Then he said, “But she was taken by the LTTE in 1990 and we haven’t seen her since.” He did not need to explain and I imagine one could not, easily. He was speaking from within context and expecting us to listen from within context. Two things struck me then: one, that I knew this tone already and two, that it was something to record. It would teach us things, of people’s lived experience, that dramatisation could not.

§

I began to meet with Commodore Boyagoda, two mornings a week at my home. This is how it worked: Commodore Boyagoda arrived and rang the doorbell. I let him in. He sat down at the dining table while I made coffee in the kitchen. I returned, poured the coffee and switched on a voice recorder. I would remind him at what point in the story we last stopped, sometimes ask a question and he would talk. After about an hour and a half, we would conclude the session – usually with my suggesting we’d probably talked enough for that day. Occasionally, at that point, we would briefly discuss the present; the political climate or other weather. Then I would walk Commodore Boyagoda back down the stairs to the door. With some long breaks we followed this routine for three and a half years.

How Commodore Boyagoda felt about these meetings I don’t actually know. You must understand that the spare voice in which we tell his story in the book is much like the one in which we spoke. Nothing is being concealed from you – rather I have striven not to add to this story any sense of significance that Commodore Boyagoda himself did not give it. He told the story plainly and it took me a long time to be familiar enough with his voice to catch the nuances in it.

I was trained, by working in the theatre, to trust in the value of repetition. The commodore told me his story many times. The first time, I tried not to interrupt his account, but simply to receive the story. That stage took about a year. Then we went over certain episodes. I would ask some questions and the commodore would give his account again. There are a few pivotal moments in the story that we discussed many times, while I listened for variations, distillations, emotional truth.

One of the most instructive recognitions for me as I listened to the commodore was to realise how much he had in fact forgotten. “It was a long time ago,” he said. At first, I found this a little surprising. Commodore Boyagoda had been through the extraordinary experience of being a prisoner – how could he have forgotten any of it? Was he suppressing something? But later I began to take it as a reminder that perhaps it is not possible to live through an experience like this, while thinking it extraordinary.

I did not wish to interrogate the commodore – that was not right. It felt important to me that I respect his privacy – and I suspect at another level I was also protecting my own. It simply felt like we had as much conversation as we could. Later on, I asked the commodore if he would have told the story differently to someone else – for example a military man of his own age rather than a civilian woman young enough to be his daughter. He said he told the story the same way always, and there was a force to the way he said this. I have come to understand that Commodore Boyagoda has decided the terms on which we should know his story. There is something about that I can only respect.

§

My instinct was to trust Commodore Boyagoda, because I did and because it was the only fair way in which to work with him and re-tell his story. Yet, I also remember the early anxiety of working on a project about which I had only instincts, no certainty. I worried about how to win the Commodore’s trust when there would, for a long time, be no signs of progress. I felt the exercise would be a failure if it was painful to him or I lost his trust.

The political climate in Sri Lanka when we started working in late 2010 was also very different, you will recall. Was I going to be complicit in creating a new risk to Commodore Boyagoda? Was I going to expose my own family to unnecessary scrutiny? At the very least, we were not sure we would be able to finish what we had started.

But deeper than all these reservations, I had been schooled to test knowledge and to question what I was told. What did I really know of the war anyway? How could I verify the commodore’s account? I told myself it was important to ask these questions. I believed it would naturally strengthen the book to have it tested in this way.

One of the areas in which this conflict played itself out was over the question of collaboration. Rumours had abounded that Commodore Boyagoda collaborated with the Tigers. He told me about these rumours. I asked him for his account – his account was always the same. He said he always answered the questions asked but knew he was not giving the Tigers privileged information. He was not privy to official secrets himself so he had none to tell, he said. I believed him. But I came back to it many times. I played the devil’s advocate with myself, asking fierce questions in capital letters in my notebook. I remember the shame I felt when one day the questions in my notebook caught Commodore Boyagoda’s eye. I realised that in my need to be accountable to other people, I could fail the man with whom I was working.

I tried to have honest conversations with myself. To me, personally, there was no national question. With the benefit of hindsight, I saw nationalism as an unfortunate ideology through which to have approached our problems in Sri Lanka – both Sinhala nationalism and Tamil nationalism. I told myself it didn’t matter to me whether Commodore Boyagoda collaborated with the LTTE; that in a hundred years’ time we would allow the smaller complicities of small men trying to survive a war.

§

But then something happened to question my confidence. Commodore Boyagoda received a call from a former LTTE cadre who had been one of the first people to interrogate him. This man told him that while working in the LTTE’s intelligence operation he had also been passing information on the LTTE to India’s intelligence body, RAW. RAW had blackmailed him into service, he said, threatening to expose a love affair that was forbidden under LTTE rules. Later he had, out of a different necessity, become an intelligence agent on behalf of the Sri Lankan army. Commodore Boyagoda was amazed by this information, just as he was to receive the call in the first place.

The man had found him on Facebook. He said that Commodore Boyagoda had been an important part of his story and that he wanted to thank him. He wanted to send him a manuscript to read in which he recounted his own story. Commodore Boyagoda didn’t read it but he emailed the manuscript to me. It took me a long time to open it. The man had not intended me to read it, nor known the commodore was working on a book of his own. But again I made Cartesian arguments against my scruples and, at least, ran a search on the name Boyagoda throughout that manuscript.

What I found was Commodore Boyagoda characterised as the traitor from whom this man had learnt to be a traitor. Despite my earlier confidence, despite what seemed like a very unreliable narrative, I was a little shaken by the suggestion. I realised then that it did matter to me – not that Commodore Boyagoda remain true to the Sri Lankan government’s cause but simply that he should not be duplicitous. I did not want him to have lied to me and I did not want him to have lied to the world. I put the question to him again.

Amazingly, Commodore Boyagoda did not seem fazed by my anxiety. He remained consistent with his own story and – most interestingly to me – did not care as much as I did about this other version coming into the world. He’d seen it all before. “Besides, what can we do?” he asked me. “Most of the people who can testify for me are dead.”

Gradually, I understood – from this episode as well as simply through the passing of more time, thought and conversation – that my schooled mistrust would do more to limit the book than to deepen it. I was not going to be able absolutely to verify stories, any more than I could absolutely anticipate the reaction of the establishment (by which I mean any of the establishments). Not only the commodore, but I too had to take some risk. I could be proved right or wrong. There were no safeguards. Even the knowledge I did gather was incomplete and could not in the end prove a better measure than instinct.

With these realisations, I abandoned my earlier plans to talk to the commodore’s cellmate or anyone else with that sort of proximity to his story. What I felt most sensibly now was the sense of obligation that such conversations would bring – if those people made time to tell me their stories, it would only be fair that I tell their stories in the book. Serving them all partially, I would have to take charge of the narrative in a different way. I could demonstrate my own ingenuity in discovering a supposedly objective ‘truth’, but I would cease to tell the Commodore’s story. And I was more interested in his voice than my own; I was sure the reader would be too.

§

In the end, the only person in his story besides the commodore that I spoke to was his wife, because it felt polite to do that much. I also read the letters the commodore had received from his family during his captivity, sent through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Of his own letters, Mrs Boyagoda told me he’d said, “What’s the point of hanging on to them?” I hesitated when the commodore brought me the bundles of ICRC forms, loosely bound together. He refused my qualms – he said, “The ICRC read them, the LTTE read them, why not you?”

I began by reading his letters from his sons. To read the letters of a woman to her husband in captivity was an intrusion to which I had to come round slowly. But it turned out also to be painful to read the letters of the children to their father. To see the tentative handwriting of an eight- and nine-year-old (the youngest being, at the time, still too small to write) was an initial shock. They asked their father if his ship was still broken? They asked if he couldn’t ask the “LTTE uncles” to let him come home. Gradually, they grew up and their letters knew more. Sometimes they revealed their troubles, sometimes they hid them. It was from the changes in the commodore’s sons that I really learnt what a long time eight years is. The most heart-breaking aspect of the job was to read the sensitive observations of the commodore’s middle son, who confided in his father that his mother said she was fine, but she was not. It was immensely difficult to read those letters, knowing this feeling child had been killed in a senseless accident less than a decade after his father’s return home.

But these things did not go in the book. The story I re-told, as I had heard it, was the one the commodore recounted, its strengths and weaknesses intact. “And if it turns out you were mistaken?” someone asked. I’m not going to like it, I said.

§

To write, I listened to the recordings I had made of my conversations with Commodore Boyagoda. While listening I made notes of the elements that had to be included; these notes formed the basis of the document I turned into sentences. Moreover, I felt it was by listening again and again to the way Commodore Boyagoda spoke – the rhythms of his speech – that I caught his meaning. Needless to say, it took this much listening – to perhaps 200 hours of conversation – before I felt I could write in the commodore’s voice.

While I wrote I talked less to the commodore and more to other people. While Commodore Boyagoda had been confined to a single cell in each location, there had been many more people beyond those walls living the daily realities and difficulties of war. I wanted to hold them in my mind even as I wrote the commodore’s particular story.

I don’t begin to suggest that I did extensive research. I went on road trips, to parts of the country where the commodore had been held, changed though these landscapes might be since the time he had known them. I usually travelled with my parents, not only for their willing and excellent company but also so we might look like an innocuous family party at a time when the authorities were suspicious of any sort of observation or investigation. I have to say that the soldiers we met on beaches were rarely taken in – looking past my parents, they would ask why I was there, what it was I did for a living?

More crucially, I simply talked to friends; mostly those who lived in and around Jaffna town throughout the years of war – Jaffna, simply because it is the only place where the Commodore was held where I also know people. Behind these conversations, naturally, were other conversations I have had in other places in the course of life, and the experience of growing up in Sri Lanka in the ’80s and ’90s.

My memory of the war in Sri Lanka starts with a return to the island in 1984 and a recurring conversation my parents had with their friends – some of whom were then choosing reluctantly to emigrate. It was a conversation about something terrible that had happened the previous year. They never mentioned what the thing was; between themselves they didn’t need to. I was five years old then and couldn’t work it out. I don’t remember when it was explained to me what these friends had faced in July 1983 and how they might never feel safe again; I only know that soon afterwards the understanding was implicit. Indeed, I grew up with this pattern of knowledge – to know increasingly difficult things, without shock, without moments of revelation.

I made successive trips to Jaffna throughout the year 2013 so that conversations might unfold naturally, aware too that I did not wish to mine people for accounts of personal and sometimes painful experiences. I simply told my friends what I was working on. The effect of doing that was extraordinary. The project was not only received universally with interest, but with a kind of vindication and relief. People seemed to suggest that here was a clearing in the forest where we might talk about the war in a subtler way. I was relieved in turn, and enormously encouraged by this response, although it redoubled the sense of responsibility I felt.

You see, the people I talked to were also the people to whom I felt myself accountable. I wrote this book most immediately, I suspect, for people like myself – who feel a burden of grief and responsibility for the Sri Lankan war. People who never did enough, understood enough. My parents’ generation saw this war begin; my generation lived its full course – I don’t believe it will be any of us who pull this island fully out of its mire. I believe we will tend it all our lives – as we must – if only so the generations that follow us can do much better than we did. If anything, this book is one small trace among tens of thousands that we hope will help them piece together a picture of what they’ve inherited. But to be truthful, I cannot yet imagine that generation. If I held myself accountable to anyone, it was to another set of people – the people who felt this war much more deeply than I did, because of where they were and who they were and what they chose to do or what they had to do. Yes, I do mean those people who are culturally or ethnically Tamil – that is an important aspect of experiences I cannot speak for – but I don’t only mean them.

So my relief, when I told my friends what I was working on, was that they did not see it as a betrayal. Indeed none of these people asked the Stockholm question. I remember one friend asked me many questions about Commodore Boyagoda’s story. He seemed to feel vindicated that this was a story that blurred the harder truths that people tell about this war. At one level he was also pleased the story was an unexpectedly good one – then suddenly, he said in anger, “How typical of the Tigers to treat outsiders well and their own people so badly.” In a flourish of resentment he said, “Perhaps it is good these people won the war; imagine a reality in which the Tigers had won.”

All this was said with an irredeemable bitterness – there was no real ‘better’ in the reality my friend described. But mostly he told me stories. I listened and he talked. He talked to connect to the things I told him about from Commodore Boyagoda’s account, and then he talked just to connect things. He told me stories from his own childhood. A little older than I am, he would have been a young teenager when the war got going. I wish I could replay for you the force and beauty of his account in which he used symbols – a set of coloured towels – to convey much more than either of us could put into words.

I remember a conversation I had in a car with a friend, while her husband was refilling the tank at a brand new post-war petrol station on a newly widened junction of roads. My friend told me how she and her brothers had inherited their parents’ perspective on the war. Her parents were of the generation that believed in the new country after the British, she said. They began by blaming the LTTE for everything bad that happened and so they had to hold that line for decades. She and her brothers had to grow up before they could take a more complex view. Sitting in her garden at dusk, she traced for me in the sand the LTTE camp that had occupied her neighbourhood. She remembered that the cadre in charge was tall and good-looking and missing a leg. We both wished he might be Sridharan from the Commodore’s story, but it seemed unlikely. We talked while she cooked – I listened to the stories she told but I also watched the way she caught each preparation before it would spoil, turning it into something else that would keep. Although she now had a fridge, she was more accustomed to managing without one, after years of blackout during the war.

More than once I asked myself whether I had discovered the true reason why I was writing this book with Commodore Boyagoda – that it would be an opening to other conversations. I had begun this project on an instinct and here I was being shown the meaning of that instinct. I struggled with a wish to share those encounters with friends. It felt wrong that the writer of the book should have the best experience of it. Yet I did not have permission to share those stories. I never asked for it; the conversations were not set up that way. I suspect that if I had asked for stories that I could put in a book I would not have got any.

All I can hope is that this book will be another spur to readers to have conversations of their own.

Indeed, this book is emerging at a time when those conversations are much easier to imagine. When we started working on the book in 2010 it felt that we in Sri Lanka lived in a kind of shocked silence. Yet even before the recent political changes, around the middle of 2013, I noticed that the language in which we talked about the war was beginning to change.

In the beginning, few people said anything. There are always brasher voices to be heard but beneath them was a silence, a different silence to the one enforced by our rulers. In the south, the phrases ‘during the war’ or ‘since the war’ came quicker, not surprisingly. They were difficult to relate to, even to those of us who had lived more apart from the war. The way the war ended made it difficult to relate to. But it was also difficult simply to conceive of an end to the war, when the war had been there for 26 years and the conflict was still there. I have one memory of picking yellow flowers outside our childhood home that, if I think about it now, predates the war; that is all.

Then, in 2013, I began to hear friends in the north and east begin to use those phrases, but with a different quality. It seemed not to mean ‘now that is over’ (as it sometimes did in the south) but ‘in that phase’ or ‘in this phase’. I began to notice people recounting their lives as stories. We have yet to see how far this goes; what histories it turns out we tell.

For these are testimonies. We have in Sri Lanka, as elsewhere, a more sinister vein of ‘storification’ in which testimony is sometimes removed from lived experience and displaced to other realms. We speak in the language of mythology and of art – an idiom too important to be used euphemistically in this way – because it is easier to talk of a woman who doesn’t know what happened to her son as a woman with a ‘story’. Art is not here to be instrumentalised, to make experience easier to consume (easy for those who don’t relate to it, alienating for those who do) along with a good glass of wine.

But we are not impartial – I would not even wish that we were. The ways in which we tell and receive these accounts are inevitably personal. So too the contents of this book are personal: for Commodore Boyagoda, for myself, for those whose voices are not heard in it and for many of our readers. Alongside the lives told are always lives lived, lives lost. Let’s not forget most histories don’t make it into book form – often not into words at all.

Sunila Galappatti has worked with other people to tell their stories, as a dramaturg, theatre director and editor. She lives in Sri Lanka and A Long Watch is her first book. 




Norway’s ‘Secrets’ are No Secret

Norway ‘Secrets’ are No Secret

Raghavan and Aijitha Kadirgamar, eldest son and daughter of assassinated Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Laskhman Kadirgamar, by their father’s funeral pyre, Colombo, 15 August 2005. Source: FP PHOTO/Indranil MUKHERJEE

 

Post summer holidays and I find myself once again responding to revisionist accounts of the Norwegian’s engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process in the domestic press. This time the subject is the aftermath of the assassination – almost certainly by the LTTE – of noted Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005. Below is my riposte, published as an op ed in The Island on 20 August 2016.

Norway ‘Secrets’ are No Secret!
The Island, August 20, 2016,

Shamindra Ferdinando’s column of 16 August,  ‘A secret Norwegian missive to ‘Dear Mr Prabhakaran’ in the wake of Kadirgamar assassination ‘ covers a lot of ground, including some remarkable claims regarding Norwegian dealings with the LTTE, in the aftermath of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar’s assassi-nation in August 2005.

First, Ferdinando states that ‘the world wouldn’t have known about the [‘secret’] Norway-LTTE contacts ….if not for whistle blower website Wikileaks’. This is to say the least a surprising claim. First, at this stage of the Sri Lankan conflict i.e. autumn 2005, Norway remained peace process facilitator as officially sanctioned by both the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. Consequently, it was only natural that Oslo sought to maintain high-level contact with both sides as and when the situation demanded it. From a peace perspective, the crisis provoked by Kadirgamar’s assassination clearly necessitated redoubled efforts to bring the two sides back to the negotiating table. And this is exactly what the Norwegians did, including via the ‘secret’ letter to LTTE leader Prabakharan that Ferdinando cites.

Second, it is hardly surprising – and certainly not unusual – that the content of such a communication was kept confidential. As is widely recognized, a crucial element of facilitating negotiations is retaining confidence of both sides in your ability and willingness to retain confidentiality as and when it is needed; indeed in most conflict contexts a peace process cannot move forward in the absence of a baseline of trust in the facilitator.

That said, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen and his Deputy Vidar Helgesen in fact shared the main points of the letter to Prabakharan with the other ‘Co-Chairs’ (EU, USA, Japan) at a meeting in Colombo on 17 August – the day after Kadirgamar’s funeral. The Norwegian letter was handed over to Anton Balasingham in London the next day by the same duo. (Concerning responsibility for the Kadirgamar killing, moreover, Helgesen states that at the 17 August London meeting, ’Balasingham didn’t say the LTTE was behind the murder, but he didn’t say it was either’.)

In this context, Ferdinando’s suggestion that as part of a ‘clandestine project’, the letter’s contents were shared with the Americans only, on the ‘under-standing’ that they were kept secret from the Sri Lankan Government, is palpably absurd. In fact its first demand, that the LTTE ‘accept the Norwegian Government’s invitation to participate in a review of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in order to find practical ways of ensuring full compliance by both parties’ perfectly mirrored the main proposal outlined in an 18 August letter from President Kumaratunga to the Norwegian Prime Minister.

This harmony of approach between Oslo and Colombo – nothing could be further from the ‘clandestine project’ insinuated by Ferdinando – appears to have been the (hardly surprising) outcome of an 16 August Colombo meeting between Kumaratunga, Petersen and Helgesen: an event even noted by Ferdinando himself.

Ferdinando goes on to state that following Kadirgamar’s assassination Norway ‘continued to mollycoddle terrorists’. And presumably, as part of its supposed ‘mollycoddling’ strategy, for good measure, he adds the suggestion that Norway ‘refrained from criticizing the LTTE’. Where to start? If facilitating a peace process at the invitation of both the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE, in itself amounts to ‘mollycoddling terrorists’ then I suppose Oslo – and Colombo – indeed stand guilty as charged.

But this is a patently absurd charge. First, any reasonable person can appreciate that negotiations minimally require the participation of both parties, and that to achieve this requires the facilitator to seek to remain in reasonable – though not necessarily friendly – terms. Second, Ferdinando offers no evidence at all in support of his claims in this regard. Indeed the only evidence he cites – the August 2005 letter to Prabhakaran – hardly reads like the work of people afraid to call a spade a spade. A demand that the LTTE ‘take effective steps to halt killings and to cease the recruitment of underage combatants’, for example, points to a number of things, but Norwegian efforts to ‘mollycoddle terrorists’ is most certainly not one of them.

All in all, Ferdinando’s somewhat slapdash treatment of the circumstances surrounding Kadirgamar’s murder – alongside the ignominious legal demise of the PTOM-S mechanism and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s election as President, unquestionably one of the pivotal political events of 2005 – fails the test of close scrutiny. While not wishing to blow personal trumpets unduly, his account would perhaps have benefitted from a careful reading of the relevant sections of my book To End A Civil War: Norway’s Peace Engagement in Sri Lanka (Hurst, 2015), which covers these and other related developments in some detail.

Mark Salter