Increasingly complex and widening conflicts have taken a huge toll on children in much of the Middle East in 2015, with parts of Africa and Asia facing protracted and relapsing wars that show no signs of abating, wrote Leila Zerrougui, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, in her annual report to the Human Rights Council. The Report covers the period from December 2014 to December 2015.

“Children were disproportionately affected, displaced and often the direct targets of acts of violence intended to cause maximum civilian casualties and terrorize entire communities,” she said in the report, describing how extreme violence affected countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Syria. “Groups perpetrating extreme violence also particularly targeted children pursuing their right to an education.”

Promoting a response to extreme violence that protects children

Military responses targeting groups using tactics of extreme violence continued to generate additional protection challenges for children. Throughout the year, militias and vigilante groups allied with States used children in support roles or as combatants. In addition, the use of airstrikes was of particular concern due, in many instances, to their indiscriminate nature.

The Special Representative reminded all involved that respect for human rights must be the basis of an effective response to extreme violence and actions must be undertaken in full compliance with international, humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. She added it is essential to emphasize the crucial role of prevention, as detailed in the UN Secretary-General’s plan of action to prevent violent extremism. Addressing the root causes of extreme violence, such as poverty and lack of economic opportunities for youth, lack of good governance, alienation of communities and political grievances, are necessary steps to find a lasting solution.

Attacks on schools and the right to education

In the report, Leila Zerrougui expressed her deep concern at the increasing number of attacks on schools, as well as military use of schools, in countries affected by war. Again in 2015, conflict disrupted the education of millions of children, creating a direct challenge to the realization of the Sustainable Development Goal of ensuring quality education for all children. She called for additional funding for education in emergencies and reminded all parties to conflict of their responsibility to ensure safe access to school.

Children, not Soldiers

In 2015, the momentum generated by the campaign Children, Not Soldiers remained strong and led to a significant reduction of verified cases of recruitment and use of children by national security forces, especially in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Myanmar. The campaign continued to mobilize political support, provide technical assistance and resources to the Governments in the process of implementing an Action Plan to end and prevent the recruitment of children. Unfortunately, renewed conflict reversed most progress accomplished in South Sudan and Yemen.

A majority of non-state armed groups listed by the Secretary-General for grave violations against children (32 out of 49) are active in countries concerned by “Children, Not Soldiers”. The campaign contributed to strengthening the tools in place to address the recruitment of children and generated new openings to engage in dialogue with armed groups on the protection of children.

“Through the campaign, Governments are developing or strengthening the legal framework to criminalize the recruitment of children and investing more resources and energy to fight impunity. This has created new openings to address other grave violations committed against children committed by all parties to conflict,” said the Special Representative, who is currently on mission in Afghanistan.

In her report to the Human Rights Council, Leila Zerrougui detailed how she used every opportunity of engagement with non-State armed groups and urges Governments to facilitate dialogue with a view to ending grave violations against children.

In her recommendations, she encourages Member States to treat children associated with armed groups primarily as victims and to use deprivation of liberty as a last resort and for the shortest time possible. She also calls for the universal ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict and for adequate resources to set up and maintain sustainable reintegration programmes for former child soldiers.

The UN Human Rights Commissioner visits Sri Lanka

UN Human Rights Commissioner Zeid Hussein has just wrapped up a four day visit to Sri Lanka. During the course of his visit Hussein reportedly held discussions a wide range of people. The photos below highlight a couple constituencies he met with that particularly interest me. The first, two of the country’s most respected Buddhist leaders,  Chief Prelates of the Malwathu and Asgiri Chapters, the Most Venerable Sumangala and Aththadassi Thera.

The second a group of Tamil civilians, who Hussein met at a welfare centre situated inside one of the numerous IDP camps that still pockmark the north of the country. Hussein’s message to them: I hope to see you living back in your own lands next time I visit. The face of the women below suggests that almost seven years after the war’s end, belief that this will actually happen someday soon sits more on the UN Commissioner’s side than hers.

Hussein concluded the visit with a press conference at which he delivered a lengthy, rousing and generally excellent statement. The report below gives a flavour of the overall message. One paragraph, however, particularly caught my attention. I think it offers real insight into both the challenges confronting Sri Lanka for genuine healing of the wounds of its decades-long conflict: and prospective solutions. Here it is:

“If mistakes are made, or significant problems are downplayed or ignored during the first few years, they become progressively harder to sort out as time goes on. While the glass is still molten, if you are quick and skilful, you can shape it into a fine object that will last for years. Once it starts to harden in misshapen form, it becomes more and more difficult to rectify. Likewise if any of the four key elements of post conflict resolution — truth-telling, accountability, reparations and institutional reform — are neglected or mishandled, unresolved resentments will fester, new strains will emerge, and a tremendous opportunity to establish long-term stability, which in turn should result in greater prosperity, will be lost.”

Here’s the news report:

Zeid warns of threat from extremists to Lanka’s recovery

Extreme nationalistic tendencies lay at the heart of Sri Lanka’s conflict, and they should not be allowed to undermine the country’s long term chances of recovery once again, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein said today.

Addressing the media in Colombo at the end of his visit to Sri Lanka, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein noted that a year ago, large numbers of Sri Lankans voted for change, for reconciliation, for truth, for justice and it would be a great shame if a minority of extreme voices — on both sides — who are bent on disruption, were allowed to prevail by creating fear where there should be hope.

“Sri Lanka needs a serious debate about these very serious issues, on which its future depends. This needs to start with a thorough, frank and honest discussion of the detailed findings of the September 2015 UN report, as it is important that all Sri Lankans rally behind the process and better understand the point of view of all the victims on all sides,” he said.

He also said that repairing the damage done by a protracted conflict is a task of enormous complexity, and the early years are crucial.

“If mistakes are made, or significant problems are downplayed or ignored during the first few years, they become progressively harder to sort out as time goes on. While the glass is still molten, if you are quick and skilful, you can shape it into a fine object that will last for years. Once it starts to harden in misshapen form, it becomes more and more difficult to rectify. Likewise if any of the four key elements of post conflict resolution — truth-telling, accountability, reparations and institutional reform — are neglected or mishandled, unresolved resentments will fester, new strains will emerge, and a tremendous opportunity to establish long-term stability, which in turn should result in greater prosperity, will be lost,” he said.

He said that his visit has been a much more friendly, cooperative and encouraging visit than the one his predecessor endured in August 2013, which was marred by vituperative attacks on her integrity, simply because she addressed a number of burning human rights issues that any High Commissioner for Human Rights would have raised at that time.

He also said that the number of torture complaints has been reduced but new cases continue to emerge — as two recent reports, detailing some disturbing alleged cases that occurred in 2015, have shown — and police all too often continue to resort to violence and excessive force.

(Colombo Gazette)

Here’s an excellent Groundviews analysis from Niran Anketell – well informed for once by comparative international experience – of Sri Lanka’s current transitional justice challenges – and what needs to be done to address them. Thoroughly recommended.

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In October 2015, the Sri Lankan government took a giant stride towards reconciliation when it co-sponsored a historic resolution at the Human Rights Council. Despite howls of protest from fringe elements within the Sinhala and Tamil community who opposed it, the Resolution was defended stoutly by mainstream members of both ruling parties, the SLMC and the TNA at a two-day Parliamentary debate also in October. However, as I noted in an article published last year, the Government’s attempt to fudge the question of international participation in trials was, to put it mildly, asking for trouble. My concern was that:

…instead of patiently doing the work of explaining the importance of a substantial international component in trials relating to serious crimes, the government has chosen instead to play word games, proudly claiming that it has averted the dreaded hybrid court.

At that time, as I pointed out, it was clear that:

..the current trajectory is a dangerous one. If the government is eventually forced to deliver on its unequivocal promises, it risks allegations of betrayal from within its constituency. If however it reneges on its commitments, it risks international censure from without and will inflame Tamil opinion from within.

Just four months after it signed off on the Geneva resolution, the government’s fudge has come home to roost. President Sirisena’s blunt rejection of any international participation in trials has triggered domestic and international concern over the sincerity of the Yahapalanaya government. Even as the Prime Minister and others scramble to repair the damage, their approach is nonetheless characterized by incoherence because they are unwilling to explicitly commit to any degree of international participation. The reason for this unwillingness is clear: delivering a special court to try international crimes with substantial international participation will involve some political cost. However, this cost will continue to rise if the government does not speedily create an enabling political atmosphere within which that cost is managed. By continuing to fudge the question, the government isn’t merely delaying the inevitable; it is also making things more difficult.

It is in creating this enabling political climate that the government is failing. To ensure political support for any Transitional Justice processes, the government must go beyond the simple appeal to instrumentalism and develop a morally persuasive case as to why Sri Lanka must deal with the past. In contrast, the government’s only arguments for dealing with the past appear now to be restricted to the need to manage international pressure and redeem the reputation of the military. Not only do these claims fail to ennoble the Sinhala public, they trap that public in a siege mindset in which it is forced to grudgingly concede on dealing with the past because it is forced to. This attitude is incompatible with genuine Transitional Justice. Moreover, it creates the space for the government’s opponents to claim that international pressure could be handled better, while conceding less. It will also, sooner or later, lead to hostility towards international demands for justice – hints of which are beginning to appear in Sirisena’s increasingly defensive rhetoric.

The moral case for Transitional Justice could be couched in terms of reconciliation or it could flow from a theory of just desserts. It may be a combination of the two. It may even be the argument that we need to reset our ways after thirty years of war, and that this calls for introspection on the way in which the despicable war or “mlechcha yuddhaya”—the term Sirisena used to describe the war one year ago at the 2015 Independence Day celebrations—was fought. There is no shortage of morally persuasive and culturally resonant claims for Transitional Justice. To be clear, this leg work needed to sustain Transitional Justice is political in nature. It requires political leadership and investment, but unless that investment is made, the costs of a Transitional Justice process for the political fortunes of those leading the government will continue to mount.

Political leadership in making the case for dealing with the case is important, but it is equally important that the government develop a comprehensive policy to deal with the past. This requires more than merely identifying mechanisms or offices the government intends to set up. Thus far, the government has identified a Truth Commission, an Office of Missing Persons, a special court and an Office of Reparations. If implemented properly, each of these mechanisms could advance Transitional Justice, but the real measure of success will be if they are able to complement each other. For instance, while trials are essential to ending impunity, they will never be able to bring justice in respect of all crimes.

The resulting ‘impunity gap’ – the gap between the number of perpetrators and crimes and the cases eventually brought to justice – must be bridged through other mechanisms. One option would be through vetting processes by which armed forces personnel responsible for human rights violations are removed from the military through a fair administrative process – another commitment by the government in the Geneva resolution. Another is through Truth Commissions which identify patterns of wrongdoing and in some cases, wrongdoers. Reparations could also help restore the dignity of victims.

The government must also make decisions about sequencing the rollout of mechanisms. Typically, reparations are undertaken towards the end of a truth-seeking process, once victims are identified and patterns of violations unearthed. In Sri Lanka’s case, however, there may be a limited role for reparations in building trust and restoring some normalcy to the lives of those most affected. Another key decision is the division of labour between and sequencing of Truth Commissions and trials. The Sierra Leonean and Peruvian examples offer interesting insights into how trials and truth-seeking commissions could complement each other, but sometimes come into conflict.

To be clear, not all of the outcomes in a Transitional Justice process could or should be choreographed. The interaction between political and other pressures on the one hand, and the momentum for victims’ rights will necessarily be dynamic. The ebb and flow of political space will also influence results. Nevertheless, some political moments offer great promise, and if this promise is to be realized, policy decisions must be made. In making these decisions, expert input and insights into comparative examples are essential, but in the final analysis, nothing can replace political vision and maturity. A tick-the-box approach to establishing mechanisms may impress some diplomats at the Human Rights Council, but it does not make for good Transitional Justice or smart politics.

Unfortunately, this sort of strategic thinking around Transitional Justice is in short supply in Sri Lanka at all levels. Worryingly, this problem is not limited to government. While many stakeholders including within civil society have plenty to say on consultations and the importance of hearing victims’ voices, there is a distinct unease with engaging in the hard graft of strategizing the long term vindication of victims’ rights. In Chile, Argentina and Peru, civil society organizations strategically used Truth Commissions to change the narrative about the past and discredit perpetrators at a time when trials appeared impossible, while at the same time pressuring the state to prosecute through foreign courts exercising universal jurisdiction and regional human rights mechanisms.

In doing so, some of those activists went into flawed Truth Commissions that were accused of shielding perpetrators, but their work eventually helped set the stage for previously unthinkable criminal trials. In Cambodia, activists and researchers began documenting crimes under the Khmer Rouge regime, collecting thousands upon thousands of pages of documentary and witness evidence many years before a hybrid court was eventually established. When the court eventually arrived, the evidence had already been collected.

In Colombia, where a 2015 peace agreement between the government and the FARC looks set to generate a Transitional Justice process, activists have built capacity behind the scenes on Transitional Justice within their networks for years, enabling an incredibly rich and multidisciplinary conversation on dealing with the past. If Transitional Justice is to work in Sri Lanka, those of us in civil society will have to rise to the challenge in new and more meaningful ways.

What then is the prognosis for Transitional Justice in 2016? President Sirisena’s comments indicate there is trouble brewing, and that is undeniable. Yet, I would argue that the problems facing Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka are more complex than a mere lack of political will. Instead, the present impasse points to the absence of two critical ingredients for success in dealing with the past: political arguments for dealing with the past grounded on comprehensible moral claims, and a strategic and comprehensive vision for Transitional Justice, in contrast to the proliferation of promised mechanisms on an ad hoc basis. Fortunately, it is not too late to change course, but if we do not, Yahapalanaya risks going down as yet another false dawn for justice in Sri Lanka.